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The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation –
Enforcement and Compliance in Professional
Services
BY PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS*

Abstract
The increased expansion of economic activity beyond national
borders leads to a shift of regulatory power. Public authorities concede
power, explicitly or tacitly, to private bodies, whereas the multilayered
ecology of global governance inevitably increases the role of
transnational institutional structures. This article examines such
developments in the area of professional services. It starts by analyzing
the self-regulation phenomenon in professional services and points to
examples where professional associations accentuate their unique nature
to justify the importance of nonintervention in their internal affairs.
Powerful professional associations have been thereby created, which,
depending on the services subsector (e.g. legal, engineering or
advertising services), are the final masters of access to and practice of a
given profession. After a critical review of the most important
professional associations at the global level, the article focuses on
instances of private enforcement and goes on to examine the role of
courts in reviewing such enforcement. In this regard, constitutionality
of private enforcement is also examined. Finally, the article refers to
the role of antitrust rules in harnessing distortive business practices that
professional associations may adopt. The article focuses in particular
on instances of private, decentralized enforcement. Whereas no truly
transnational private regulation in professional services has yet
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Senden for insightful comments and valuable discussions. Remaining errors are of the
author’s alone. Contact: p.delimatsis@uvt.nl.

2

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 40:1

emerged, it is submitted that the foundations for such a development are
being built progressively as a result of borderless activities in this sector
and a relatively deferential stance on the side of the State.

I. Introduction
In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court had to decide on
whether pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets necessary to hire
legal counsel of choice violated the Sixth Amendment.1 The Supreme
Court answered in the affirmative. This judgment is important for various
reasons. For our purposes, it is significant because, after many decades of
judicial interpretations about several aspects of legal services, it confirmed
the hybrid nature of legal services pending between the private interests of
economic actors, such as those of lawyers, on one side, and the public
interest that lawyers are still called upon to defend today.
The public nature of the legal profession is exemplified more
eloquently in the objective of the smooth administration of justice. Indeed,
as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gideon,2 the respect of the right to
be heard is inextricably associated with the right of choosing the ‘guiding
hand’ of legal counsel. This fundamental right to counsel3 epitomizes the
distinguished role of lawyers as facilitators of the need for respecting
constitutional rights and due process in virtually all legal traditions.4
The hybrid nature of legal activity means that courts will acknowledge
the economic character of lawyers’ activities and will occasionally find that
the public character of their functioning does not exempt them from the
application of obligations that other trades, businesses, or professions must
abide by. For instance, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
has recently found that the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts
applies to legal services – in this case, a contract between a lawyer and a
client-consumer relating to legal fees.5 Such obligations would apply in
addition to the obligations of independence, confidentiality and ethical
requirements. The fact that an asymmetry of information and technical

1. See Luis v United States, 578 U. S. __ (2016), judgment of March 30, 2016.
2. See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).
3. See Grosjean v American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243, 244 (1936).
4. Recently, the Court accepted that under certain rare and exceptional circumstances,
attorney fees may increase based on the so-called “lodestar approach”, again recognizing the
importance of adequately compensating attorneys who facilitate the administration of justice and
sometimes substitute for the deficiencies of the public prosecution system. See US Supreme
Court, Perdue v Kenny A., 559 U. S. 542 (2010).
5. See Case C-537/13, Birutė Šiba v Arūnas Devėnas, 2015 E.C.R., [hereafter Birutė Šiba]
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knowledge exists by nature in this bilateral relationship weighed heavily in
the decision of the court.6
Similar judgments that attempt to draw a balance between the public
and the private nature of professionals abound. Globalization of economic
activity raises new questions and concerns, notably because the activity of
professionals may not be subject to domestic regulations due to the lack of
jurisdiction. As the issue of jurisdiction becomes blurred, private regulation
developed by transnational professional bodies is growing in prominence. The
legal profession has only been part of a more general trend that clearly
surfaces in professional services.7
The objective of this article is to map the landscape of transnational
self-regulation in professional services and critically review instances (and
potential problems) of enforcement, be it private, public or hybrid.
Transnational self-regulation in professional services examines the
emerging body of rules created by private actors that are active beyond
national borders and attempts to manage ex ante potential challenges that the
global nature of economic activity brings about. Increased globalization of
economic activity leads to a shift of regulatory power from public to private
and from national to global. Driven by the forces of globalization of business,
these private actors aim to offer handy solutions to global professionals
through rule-making activities that take place “in the shadow of the law” and
the traditional forms of State regulatory making.8
Inevitably, the issue of legitimacy of such actors emerges. 9 Domestic
self-regulated professional associations typically draw their legitimacy by
an act transferring powers from public bodies to such associations.
However, transnational professional associations claim legitimacy through the
participation of domestic private bodies in such associations. This “derived
legitimacy” can be highly problematic, notably in regards to enforcement.
At the outset, it appears opportune to delineate the services sectors
that we will focus on. According to the sectoral classification list (W/120)
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)10 of the World
6. See also, Case C-94/04, Cipolla, 2006 E.C.R. I-11421.
7. For an early account, see Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for
More Governance?, 90:2 AM. J. INT’L L. 250 (1996).
8. For an economic perspective on alternative modes of governance, see the treatise by
AVINASH DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS – ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE (2004).
9. See Richard Stewart, Enforcement of Transnational Public Regulation, in ENFORCEMENT
OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION – ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 41, 44 (Fabrizio
Cafaggi, ed., 2012).
10. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), Annex 1B, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994), as reported in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
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Trade Organization (WTO),11 professional services do not form an
independent services sector, but are classified as a subsector of business
services.12 This classification contains 11 broad services sectors and one
residual category of “other services.” These sectors are further divided into
sub-sectors and sub-subsectors. The W/120 follows the structure of the
more detailed provisional Central Product Classification (CPC) system
agreed upon within the United Nations.13 Professional services within the
meaning of the GATS are considered to include a wide array of professions
such as accounting, law, architecture, advertising, architecture, engineering,
management consulting or market research.14
This article focuses on the regulation and enforcement of transnational
private regulation in legal, architectural and engineering services. After a
review of recent trends in business and professional services in Section II,
Section III discusses the rationale behind the regulation of professional
services as well as its peculiarities. An analysis of the transnational
dimension of legal, engineering and architectural services, including the
relevant actors and processes, follows in Section IV. The interaction
between private enforcement and judicial review is discussed in Section V,
whereas Section VI tackles the possibility of invoking constitutional claims
that can be raised against restrictive self-regulatory practices. Section VII
critically reviews the existing case law relating to the role of antitrustrelated claims to trump private regulation and enforcement practices by
professional associations. Section VIII concludes.

II. The Importance of Professional Services – Recent Trends
Global trade in services has grown in the last 20 years in a steadier
manner than merchandise trade. Importantly, services have been more resilient
than goods to the macroeconomic upheaval of recent times. Trade in services
suffered significantly only in 2009, decreasing almost 10 percent. However, in

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999) [hereinafter GATS].
11. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO
Agreement].
12. GATS, supra at note 10, “Services Sectoral Classification List,” MTN.GNS/W/120, 10
July 1991. The GATS is the first and only international agreement regulating trade in services,
agreed on as an Annex to the World Trade Organization Agreement entered into force in 1995.
13. United Nations Statistical Papers, Provisional Central Product Classification, Series M
No. 77, (1991). The United Nations Statistics Division currently uses the CPC Version 2.1.
14. See GATS, supra at note 10, “Trade in Professional Services,” Note by the Secretariat,
MTN.GNS/W/67, (1989).
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2010, it resumed its precrisis levels, whereas global services exports grew by
five percent in 2014. On average, trade in services has still increased by
eight percent annually in the last two decades. Exports of commercial
services by WTO Members totalled US$4.87 trillion in 2014, about a fifth
of global trade. Having said this, such statistics routinely underestimate the
value of services trade, as they fail to capture investment flows by foreign
affiliates in an accurate way. For instance, in terms of value added,
services are regarded as accounting for 40 percent of total trade.15
Services account for most of US and world economic output. An
average of over 70 percent of GDP and jobs in the OECD countries are due
to a service-related activity. The EU is the leading importer and exporter
of services,16 followed by the US. Business services play a particularly
important role in all modern economies and are regarded as essential drivers of
economic growth. Many of the activities covered by this sector of the
economy (legal, accounting and auditing, market research, advertising, and
other business activities such as computer services, real estate, or R&D) have
fully exploited the outsourcing phenomenon, which may explain their
recent rapid growth. The rapid development of business process
outsourcing (BPO) is the result of unprecedented advances in information
and communication technologies (ICT) and their application to everyday
business. Outsourcing of legal services typically occurs through subcontracting certain services to an independent supplier. However, large law
firms may decide to establish their own premises abroad and thus control
recruitment and training. This is the case with Clifford Chance in India, for
instance. Outsourcing parts of a project has also increased in architecture.
More specifically, the global market for legal process outsourcing
(LPO) accounted for over US $1 billion in 2012, growing exponentially
since the burst of the financial crisis in 2008. Estimates suggest that LPO
could grow as much as US $8.5 billion by 2020, leading to the blossoming
of a new sub-sector of legal services, that is legal support services.17 With
an average rate of 30 percent annually, LPO is the fastest growing segment
in India.18 Revenue from LPO is expected to exceed US$1 billion in 2016
15. See Rainer Lanz & Andreas Maurer, Services and Global Value Chains – Some
Evidence on Servicification of Manufacturing and Services Networks, WTO Working Paper
ERSD-2015-03, (2015).
16. Being a customs union, the 28 member States of the European Union (EU) are trivially
taken as one entity (customs territory) in global statistics.
17. See Grand View Research, Legal Process Outsourcing (LPO) Market Analysis by
location, by services and segment forecasts to 2020, April 2014. See also Integreon, ‘Submission
on Legal Process Outsourcing to ABA Commission on Ethics 20 /20,’ June 2010.
18. ValueNotes, LPO fastest growing segment in India, March 12, 2014, http.//www.sourci
nquotes.com/content/view/913/1.
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and to employ 32,000 professionals in India. In addition, it transforms
outsourcing, as Indian IT companies active in BPO also offer LPO to their
global clients. Outsourcing-related work has more recently evolved to satisfy
demands for higher quality, giving rise to a new phenomenon, called
‘knowledge process outsourcing’ (KPO). In India only, KPO employed
more than 250,000 professionals in 2014.19
The increasing willingness of companies located in developed
countries, mainly in Europe and the United States, to outsource noncore
business functions also reinforces this trend. This trend was affected by the
recent financial crisis only momentarily. From call centers to legal
research and text editing, manifold operations of developed-country
companies are supplied by companies established in India, Philippines or
elsewhere nowadays.20 This phenomenon explains the fact that almost half
of the cross-border exports of services worldwide is in business services.
Bar associations acknowledged the paradigm shift and revised their rules to
accommodate contemporary concerns relating to professional liability,
integrity and independence. For instance, the American Bar Association
(ABA) recently revised its model rules on professional conduct to tackle, inter
alia, the growing phenomenon of outsourcing.21
Business services are typically provided to other enterprises (but also
to public administration), whereby they often become part of complex
production processes. Nonetheless, several business services, such as legal,
engineering or architectural services, are also supplied to households.
Business services exert an enabling role in bettering competiveness and overall
performance of any economy. For instance, in terms of value added, business
services was the largest sector within the EU-28’s nonfinancial business
economy. In the EU, business services account for over half of the nonfinancial business economy and for about 30 percent of total trade in services.
In the EU only, about 21 million people and over 4 million enterprises
provide services in business services, many of them being small and medium
enterprises (SMEs).22 Legal, accounting, management consultancy,
engineering and architectural services hold the lion’s share in this area of
services.23 While hit by the financial crisis, these services recorded doubledigit growth between their mid-crisis lows in 2009 and the second quarter
19. Id.
20. For a study on BPO, see UNCTAD, E- Commerce and Development Report 2003 (United
Nations Publication, 2003), Chapter 5. http.//www.sourcinquotes.com/content/view/ 913/1.
21. See Model Rules of Prof’L Conduct R.5.3 (2012).
22. See European Commission, High-Level Group on Business Services – Final Report, 63 (2014).
23. “Business services: recent economic developments,” statistics in focus,
EUROSTAT, Issue 35 (2011).
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of 2015.24 Export of such services in the EU and the U.S. have also grown
quite substantially, recording an increase of eight percent and seven
percent, respectively, in the years 2010-2013. They both account for
around 40 percent of global trade in business services.25
The importance of several business services lies in their added value,
that is, the overall impact they have on the economy. Subsectors of
business services, such as legal services or advertising, have value-added
traits leading to higher labour productivity and positive spillovers. For
instance, advertising is essentially a distributive activity with a high level
of turnover and high sales relative to personnel costs. The same goes for
professional services.
The growth of the sector globally is driven by strong export demand,
whereas innovations in ICT increase opportunities for further development
of the sector trespassing geographical borders and downplaying previously
insurmountable barriers. Business, professional and technical services are
among the most flourishing services sectors in the developed world.26
Developing countries keep apace closely. Other than India, where those sectors
are among the main export sectors, in Brazil, those sectors accounted for 45
percent of Brazil’s total commercial services exports in 2007, with a value of
over US$10 billion. Architectural, engineering and other technical consultancy
services are the largest subsectors, followed by legal services. In certain sectors
like engineering, offshoring is the first stage sometimes leading to bigger shifts
of production loci in emerging countries.27
The phenomenon of outsourcing has also contributed greatly to the
rapid growth of the business sector, as businesses increasingly realize the
benefits that they can seize by buying business services through specialized
enterprises instead of producing them in-house. Having said this, certain
service activities are more readily exportable than others. This is due to the
fact that they are transferable more easily through electronic means, they do
not require commercial presence (or require only a limited one) nor thorough
knowledge of the export market, its laws or preferences. This is, for
instance, the case with computer services and increasingly with some
professional services, education or health care services. The same goes for

24. See, “Services statistics – short-term indicators,” EUROSTAT, September 2015,
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Services_statistics
_-_short-term_ indicators.
25. See WTO, International Trade Statistics 2015, pp. 143, 144.
26. Id. at 144.
27. See Leonard Lynn and Hal Salzman, Engineers, Firms and Nations: Ethical Dilemmas
in the New Global Environment, in ENGINEERING ETHICS FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD 15, 20
(Colleen Murphy et al., eds., 2015).
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various back office support and so-called knowledge services such as
research and development.

III. Regulating Professional Services
A. The Challenges of Regulating Professionals
Services are typically nontangible, nonstorable, and above all
heterogeneous with limited possibilities of mass production. Thus, many
of the most “effective” barriers to free movement of services relate to preor post-establishment of juridical and natural persons.28 Such barriers are
typically enshrined in domestic regulations promulgated by public, but also
private bodies. Quality, the “holy grail” of every law or regulation governing
services, is closely intertwined with the characteristics, qualifications,
experience, and so forth of each individual service provider. This trait of
services regulations increases the transaction costs and undermines the pursuit
of efficiency when regulating this highly heterogeneous sector of the economy.
Regulations on services are designed by a well-intentioned
government which, driven by public interest considerations, seeks to
contend with perceived market failures such as those typically associated
with externalities, information inadequacies, or imperfect competition and
misuse of market power.29 In the case of professional services, information
asymmetries and competition concerns appear to be the most important
market failures. Information inadequacies mostly appear in a wide range of
intermediation and knowledge-based services. The nature of the services
supply and the direct contact involved between suppliers and consumers
generate significant risks. The consequences of asymmetric information
may not be easily reversible for consumers who lack information about the
skills that a given service supplier has.30 While the quality of some
products, such as milk or sugar, can be ascertained on inspection prior to
sale (search goods), others, including almost all types of services, cannot
be evaluated until received, used or consumed (experience goods).31 In
28. Cf Panagiotis Delimatsis, Due Process and “Good” Regulation Embedded in the GATS
– Disciplining Regulatory Behaviour in Services Through Article VI of the GATS, 10:1 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 13, 16 (2007).
29. Carlo Gamberale & Aaditya Mattoo, Domestic Regulations and Liberalization of Trade
in Services, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 290 (Bernard Hoekman et
al., eds., 2002); also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15- 35 (1982).
30. Cf. Birutė Šiba, supra note 5, at ¶23.
31. Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78:2 J. POLIT. ECON. 311
(1970); also George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84:3 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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extreme cases (e.g., construction of a house ostensibly complying with antiseismic regulations), the effects of use or consumption are made known
only years later (credence goods).32
Since markets may not provide appropriate incentives for the acquisition
and dissemination of information, appropriate legislation that requires disclosure
of certain information could in theory remedy the problem. Nevertheless, it may
be too expensive to communicate the necessary information to individual
consumers. In such cases, instead of educating the consumers, it is more costeffective to regulate suppliers. In particular, the governmental intervention will
prescribe the type of information that needs to be provided and will thereby help
potential buyers evaluate the information that is being supplied.
An interference with the market may be motivated by the need for
accomplishing noneconomic, social goals, such as redistribution of income,
consumer protection, universal service, etc., in order to assure equity, or may even
take place because of clearly paternalistic motivations.33 These regulatory goals
are rather horizontal in nature; hence, they are applicable across the board to all
services sectors. This fact can be decisive when determining the nature of the
instruments (e.g., whether they should be specific to a certain sector or of
general application). In other words, the fact that similar public policy
objectives are sought across sectors may be indicative of the need to use
similar instruments. This, however, may be way too simplistic an approach, as
an objective can be served in various degrees; and this already within a given
services sector such as professional services. For instance, the higher stakes
for the consumer and the public good in the area of engineering rather than
advertising services will lead to heavier regulation of access to the former
profession. In this case, ex ante regulatory intervention acts preventively.
Professional services are regarded as labour-intensive services. Their central
trait is the supply of human capital acquired through high standards of education
and training. In addition, access to professional services is typically subject to
certain licensing and qualification requirements, which determine issues relating
to entry and practice of a given profession.34 Such requirements are imposed
either by the State or through self-regulation by professional bodies – or both. In
the latter case, access restrictions imposed by professional bodies dominated by
active market participants are not based on quality-related considerations but aim

32. Michael Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,
16:1 J. LAW ECON. 67 (1973). The authors demonstrate that in the case of goods that have
credence qualities, a governmental intervention would not lead to an efficient allocation of
resources and thus would be preferable to leave the market unregulated.
33. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 51 (1994).
34. See, Duc Nguyen-Hong, “Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services,” Productivity
Commission Staff Research Paper, (2000).
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many times at restricting supply of newcomers artificially, thereby keeping
prices at a high level to the benefit of incumbents.35 For instance, studies
showed that State licensing requirements and ABA regulations lead to excessive
earnings premiums for lawyers.36
Typically, in this case the regulating bodies of the professional
associations are the fora whereby like-minded incumbents harmonize their
practice and essentially act as yet another cartel.37 As noted recently by the
United States Supreme Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners v. FTC, dual allegiances are not always apparent to a professional
who also acts as a regulator.38 The resulting monopoly outcome reallocates
income from lower income consumers to higher income professionals.39
Harmonization and mutual recognition efforts in the area of business
services and notably professional services already within the EU, which is a
fairly integrated example of transnational legal order, have met with limited
overall success to date.40 Even for professional services, where automatic
recognition of professional qualifications was agreed on within the EU, such as
architecture, one should not lose sight of the fact that this was the result of
lengthy negotiations and discussions that lasted more than fifteen years.41
This is not to say that harmonization and mutual recognition in the area of
professions is a walkover. On the contrary, professional peculiarities abound and
complicate any effort to draw common standards even within federal or quasifederal, decentralized systems. To name but one example, because of the
heterogeneous country-specific characteristics and requirements of practice in the
engineering profession, automatic recognition may not be the wisest option.
All these professional peculiarities highlight the difficulties that any
horizontal, i.e., across-services sectors, regulatory intervention may face.
35. See MORRIS KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING
COMPETITION? 65 – 96 (2006).
36. Such premiums amounted to $64 billion in 2004, or $71,000 per lawyer. See CLIFFORD
WINSTON ET. AL, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011).
37. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2014).
38. The Court noted that for this reason antitrust accountability is necessary to ensure the
undistorted functioning of markets. See, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v.
FTC, 574 U.S. __ (2015); also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U. S.
492, 500 (1988).
39. Maury Gittleman et al., Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational
Licensing, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20961, (2015).
40. See TINNE HEREMANS, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IN EU INTERNAL MARKET – QUALITY
REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION (2012).
41. EEC Directive 85/384/EEC 1985 OJ L 223/15 on the mutual recognition of diplomas,
certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications in architecture, including measures to
facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services.
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Within the EU, two major achievements in the wake of the new millennium
gave a new impetus to the liberalization of regulated professions.42 The
first is the adoption of the directive on professional qualifications (PQD)
providing for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications for such
professions.43 Contrary to previous practice, the directive also called for
the recognition of qualifications of those professionals who offer their
services in another EU Member State (MS) only temporarily. In addition, the
directive confirmed the automatic recognition for certain professions, such as
doctors, architects or midwives,44 and in essence requires the mutual
recognition of practical experience for professionals. The most recent directive
amending the PQD introduced the European professional card, a mechanism
that will further lead to the erosion of protectionist biases by host MS, but also
facilitate mobility of professionals within the EU.45 For instance, in several
EU MS the use of the engineering card, a professional card for engineers,
which documents educational and professional qualifications and other
information with a view to simplifying recognition, is a reality for the sector.46
The other achievement in the realm of liberal professions in the EU was the
adoption of the Services Directive.47 To be sure, its timing was unfortunate, as it
was associated with the fear of several MS against uncontrolled flows of migrants
from the new Eastern European MS to the “old” EU15 MS. Thus, the major tool
to achieve full integration in the area of services, i.e., the country of origin
principle, did not find its way to the final text of the Directive. Having said that,
this principle was replaced by the principle of free movement in services set out in
Article 16 of the Services Directive.48 In addition, the Services Directive is an
important legislative development in that it confirmed the importance of home
country control49 and that the host country can only take measures in exceptional

42. See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Standardization in Services – European Ambitions and
Sectoral Realities, 3 EUR. L. REV. 513 (2016). See also Erik Canton et al., The Economic Impact
of Professional Services Liberalization, European Commission Economic Papers No 533, (2014).
43. Directive 2005/36/EC on professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255/22.
44. Automatic recognition means that no discretion is left to the host country. See Case C365/13, Ordre des architects, E.C.R. 280.
45. See Counsil Directive 2013/55, 2013 O.J. (L. 354/132) (EU). See also European
Commission, “Action Lines for Liberal Professions – Final Report of the Working Group,” 7
(2015).
46. See High- Leval Group on Business Services, note 22, at 120.
47. Council Directive 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L376/36) [hereinafter Services Directive].
48. See European Commission, Handbook on the implementation of the Services
Directive 36 (2007).
49. See also Case C-458/08, Commission v Portugal, 2010 E.C.R. I-11599. This is also in
line with the expression of the principle of mutual recognition in the area of services in cases like
C-76/90, Säger, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221; Cipolla, supra note 6.
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circumstances relating to the safety of a given service.50
There are 4,600 regulated professions in the EU nowadays. In the case of
professional services, an important subsector of business services, regulatory
diversity already at a subnational level creates challenges for service suppliers who
are interested in exploring market access opportunities beyond their region.
Professional services regulations may differ substantially among the various
professions based on manifold public policy considerations, but also long-standing
traditions protected faithfully by professional associations. This sector displays
restrictive regulatory measures spanning from burdensome entry requirements
(e.g., licensing restrictions or onerous procedures) to sometimes prohibitive postentry requirements, such as restrictions (or even outright prohibitions) on
advertising; fixed or recommended minimum or maximum prices; reserved tasks
and exclusive rights; or mandatory business structure and multidisciplinary
practices.51 This indicates that, even within highly integrated markets, such as the
U.S. or the EU, services maintain their trait of being very vulnerable to regulations
impeding their supply.52

B. Delegation, Self-Regulation, Co-Regulation
As noted earlier, the potentially chilling effect of regulations is in part due to
the peculiar nature of services relating to the intangibility, nonstorability and
heterogeneity. It is all the more so in professional services where serving the
interests of each client necessitates a different treatment by the professional service
supplier. In addition, the quality of the service is closely intertwined with the
characteristics, education, qualifications, or experience of each individual service
provider, as well as the domestic preferences and traditions of each EU MS.
It is in part this peculiar nature of services that had led several
countries to abandon “command-and-control” regulation in professional
services and essentially outsource the establishment of rules relating to the
access and pursuit of a profession to the respective professional
associations. The fact that professionals in the three professions covered in
this article have grown in prominence is also a factor that made selfregulation be regarded as an appealing alternative to state regulation. Crucially,
private ordering in the field of professional services has been diachronic; such
rules existed before the adoption of public regulation; once the latter emerged,
private ordering has coexisted with – and many times de facto superseded –
public forms of regulation.
50. See Art. 18 in conjunction with Art. 35 of the Services Directive, supra note 47.
51. Cf. Report on Competition in Professional Services, COM(2004) 83 (EC).
52. See also PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND DOMESTIC
REGULATIONS – NECESSITY, TRANSPARENCY AND REGULATORY DIVERSITY 62 (2007).
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Self-regulation entails an explicit or tacit transfer of authority to
private bodies, which allows them to delineate a sphere of expertise,
establish conditions for membership, limit competition for nonmembers (either
because they objectively do not qualify or because the incumbents want to
maximise their rents), and impose deontological rules of conduct on
professionals which would protect the integrity of the profession and ensure
the quality of the service provided.53 Self-regulation further entails monitoring
of compliance with such rules and instituting enforcement mechanisms.54
Compliance in particular with private enforcement mechanisms would be a
function of the importance of the membership. If exit is costly, then
compliance will most likely occur to avoid negative effects on the possibility
for trading in the future.
Professional associations regulate access and pursuit of a given
profession ostensibly with a view to ensuring high levels of consumer
protection. However, they also represent the professionals. Therefore,
their role is to promote the interests of their members. More often than not,
the two functions (regulatory and representative) cannot be easily reconciled.
Thus, conflicts of interest may and do actually arise, notably because of the
exercise of this dual function performed by private regulators.
In establishing rules relating to the regulation of professions, the
private sector is called upon to fulfill a decisive regulatory role and serve
the objective of managing access to the profession with a view to
improving efficiency, quality, and competitiveness. Surveillance and
enforcement of these rules is typically guaranteed by the fact that
registration with the relevant professional body is a precondition for the
taking up and pursuit of the particular profession at issue. Compulsory
registration allows for more effective supervision of professional conduct
and, accordingly, sanctions against those professionals who do not adhere
to the rules established by the professional body, including deontological
rules usually contained in the respective sectoral code of conduct (CoC).
Disciplinary cases can be treated more efficiently due to the Damoclean
sword of exclusion from the club in case of noncompliance.55
According to Dixit, such relation-based governance systems can work
only provided that, (i) the norms of good conduct are clearly understood;

53. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE (1994).
54. See also Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a Post-regulating World, 54 in CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 103 (2001).
55. See also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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and (ii) information about adherence or rather violations of these norms
must be diffused to all members of the association accurately and quickly.56
However, in practice, the accuracy of communication and adherence to the
norms and collective sanctions which is necessary for the success of such
associations can be challenged by the number and heterogeneity of
transactors and the increased size and complexity of transactions.57 Indeed,
self-regulation seems to work better in small, relatively homogeneous and
interconnected industries where the threat of outside regulation adequately
incentivizes the industry to regulate itself.58 More generally, good
regulation nowadays implies that a regulator is able to adopt different
responsive enforcement strategies depending on whether the regulatee is a
leader, reluctant complier, the recalcitrant or the incompetent.59
To retain self-regulatory powers, professional associations emphasize
the central role of specialized expertise and the existing institutional
arrangements to maintain the benefits of such expertise. This would allow
them to create their own “living space,” shielded from the market and the
state.60 This may be necessary in order to protect their alleged uniqueness and
independence. For instance, the preamble of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct of the American Bar Association (ABA) provides:
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although
other professions also have been granted powers of selfgovernment, the legal profession is unique in this respect
because of the close relationship between the profession and
the processes of government and law enforcement. This
connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority

56. Avinash Dixit, “Relation-based Governance and Competition” (on file with the author).
57. Others have argued that the a coordinating function ensuring a common logic, i.e., a
system of reasoning that generates unique common knowledge classifications of conduct,
provided by a third-party (private) institution supplying a system of neutral reasoning could
ensure the sustainability of a decentralized enforcement system. See Gillian Hadfield & Barry
Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order, 4:2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 471 (2012).
58. Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 154 (Richard Baldwin et al., eds., 2010).
59. Neil Gunningham, Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 121, 126 (Richard Baldwin et al., eds., 2010).
60. See Tanina Rostain, Self-Regulatory Authority, Markets, and the Ideology of
Professionalism, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 169, 170 (Richard Baldwin et al.
eds., 2010), noting that “as professions obtained self-regulatory powers, they instituted
measures – including educational and accreditation standards, ethics codes, and workplace
structures – to demarcate spaces of discretionary expertise insulated from penetration by
either market logic or state control.”
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over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation
is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession’s independence from government domination. An
independent legal profession is an important force in
preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority
is more readily challenged by a profession whose members
are not dependent on government for the right to practice.
By the same token, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe
(CCBE), which is the ABA counterpart in Europe, has also taken issue with
public regulation in the field of legal services by emphasizing that:61
An independent legal profession is the cornerstone of a free
and democratic society. Self-regulation, conceptually, must
be seen as a corollary to the core value of independence.
Self-regulation addresses the collective independence of the
members of the legal profession. Exclusive direct state
regulation, without a leading role for the profession in the
setting and enforcing of standards of conduct and of service,
is incompatible with an independent legal profession.
The CCBE went on to underscore the benefits of self-regulation such as
voluntary availability of expertise to regulate the subject matters relating to the
legal profession, high level of acceptance of standards set and enforced by
professional colleagues, flexibility and cost-effectiveness.
The importance of the independence of the legal profession has also been
hailed by the judiciary. The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Law Society of British Columbia ruled:62

61. See CCBE Position on Regulatory and Representative Functions of Bars (June
2005),
http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/ccbe_position_on_reg
1_1182254709.pdf (last visited on Jan. 15, 2016).
62. Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia (1982) 2.S.CR. 307,
336-7 (Can.). See also Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Lawyers
Collective v. Bar Council of India and others, W.P. 1526/1995, at ¶56 (2009). See, along
these lines, the statement by the CJEU in Jakubowska: “The absence of conflicts of interest
is essential to the practice of the profession of lawyer and requires, in particular, that
lawyers should be in a situation of independence vis-à-vis the public authorities and other
operators, by whom they must never be influenced.” C-225/09, 729, ¶61 (2010).
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The independence of the Bar from the state in all its
pervasive manifestations is one of the hallmarks of a free
society. Consequently, regulation of these members of the
law profession by the state must, so far as by human
ingenuity it can be so designed, be free from state
interference, in the political sense, with the delivery of
services to the individual citizens in the state,
particularly in fields of public and criminal law. The
public interest in a free society knows no area more
sensitive than the independence, impartiality and
availability to the general public of the members of the
Bar and through those members, legal advice and
services generally. The uniqueness of position of the
barrister and solicitor in the community may well have
led the province to select self-administration as the
mode for administrative control over the supply of legal
services throughout the community.
In India, the Apex Court noted in Indian Council of Legal Aid and
Advice v. Bar Council of India that:63
The bar Councils are enjoined with the duty to act as
sentinels of professional conduct and must ensure that
the dignity and purity of the profession are in no way
undermined. Its job is to uphold the standards of
professional conduct and etiquette. Thus, every State
Bar Council and the Bar Council of India has a public
duty to perform, namely, to ensure that the monopoly of
practice granted under the Act is not misused or abused
by a person who is enrolled as an advocate. The Bar
Councils have been created at the State level as well as
the Central level not only to protect the rights, interests
and privileges of its members but also to protect the
litigating public by ensuring that high and noble
traditions are maintained so that the purity and dignity
of the profession are not jeopardized. It is generally
believed that members of the legal profession have
certain social obligations, e.g., to render “pro bono
63. Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India 1995 1 SCC 732 (India).

2017]

The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation

17

publico” service to the poor and the underprivileged.
Since the duty of a lawyer is to assist the court in the
administration of justice, the practice of law has a
public utility flavour and, therefore, he must strictly and
scrupulously abide by the Code of Conduct behoving
the noble profession and must not indulge in any activity
which may tend to lower the image of the profession in
society. That is why the functions of the Bar Council
include the laying down of standards of professional
conduct and etiquette which advocates must follow to
maintain the dignity and purity of the profession.
In a similar vein, the US Supreme Court stated in Goldfarb:64
The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the
primary governmental function of administering justice,
and have historically been “officers of the courts.”
However, the more such associations control the market for the supply
of a given service, the more frequent complaints of their excessive power
and abuse become. Furthermore, regulatory capture can occur not only
when governments regulate, but also in the case of self-regulation by
professional associations.65 In addition, existing barriers relating, for instance,
to lack of recognition of professional qualifications or to licensing conditions
generate deadweight losses. These characteristics of services regulations
increase transaction costs and can undermine the pursuit of efficiency when
regulating this highly heterogeneous sector of the economy. This regularly
leads governmental authorities to scrutinize complaints about anticompetitive
practices, market foreclosure, excessive prices and monopolies, and to balance
the interest of maintaining the delegation of power to such private bodies
against the public interest. Some go as far as to advocate deregulation of
certain professional services.66
A central issue in professional services is what form of regulation can
64. Lewis Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773 (1975).
65. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971);
Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 (1974); & John
Kay, The Forms of Regulation, FINANCIAL REGULATION – OR OVER-REGULATION 33 (Arthur
Seldon, ed., 1998).
66. See, with respect to the legal sector, James Moliterno, The Trouble with Lawyer
Regulation, 62 EMORY LAW J. 101 (2013).

18

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 40:1

better achieve the legitimate objectives that are relevant for each
profession, such as the integrity of the profession, professional competence,
consumer protection and the like. Typically, state intervention is premised
on the need to address market failures, most notably created by information
asymmetries between service providers and their clients regarding the
quality of services rendered. Indeed, where information costs are high, ex
ante regulation of the industry and setting of quality standards may be an
adequate form of regulation. Opponents of self-regulation would argue that
it can only be justified by a self-interest maximiser viewpoint,67 as the
protection of public interest can only be ensured by state intervention. This
paternalistic view is premised on the belief that professional associations
cannot adequately protect the interests of their members and those of
consumers at the same time. Consumer lobbies may actually also subscribe
to this paternalistic view, notably on price competition grounds.
On the other side of the spectrum, proponents of self-regulation would
argue that a bottom-up approach would be more apposite due to expertise
and insider knowledge that only the professionals themselves may have.
Especially when the private group entrusted with self-regulatory powers is
sufficiently cohesive or solidary and pursues State-like objectives, thereby
acting as another agent of the State, transfer of resources to such groups
appears to be the most efficient solution for the State.68 Professional
associations can draft and review rules more quickly and flexibly than any
State authority to better serve consumers without unduly hampering the
supply of the services at issue. Norm-making groups may also adapt more
quickly in the aftermath of exogenous shocks, thereby showing their
mutability forces that partly explain their dominance in norm-making.69 In
that case, any state interference would be counter-productive, whereas any
legal rules designed to regulate intra-group relations would negatively affect
the group’s ability to regulate its members. In fact, with the exception of rules
that deter extreme bad faith conduct, even rules that merely duplicate the
group’s own norms will generally undermine self-regulation.70
Self-regulation cannot be regarded as an absolute prerogative, as
67. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBOURS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991), using several case-studies to show that members of a close-knit group
develop and abide by norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in their work-a-day affairs with one another.
68. See Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 CHICAGO L. REV. 133, 136 (1996).
69. See, generally, RESILIENT LIBERALISM IN EUROPE’S POLITICAL ECONOMY, (Vivien
Schmidt & Mark Thatcher, eds., 2015); Robert Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3: 1
AM. L.& ECON. REV. 1, 22 (2001).
70. Id.
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private groups exercise power that can be reclaimed by the state or
constrained by the public judicial system. More generally, experiments
with regulation and regulatory approaches are a frequent phenomenon
nowadays.71 Co-regulation or cooperative regulation in several sectors of the
economy is, for instance, a form of regulation that goes beyond the coercion
that State authority can exert.72 Co-regulatory approaches allow self-regulation
and state regulation to meet with a view to optimizing regulatory performance
and more efficiently addressing market failures and certain malfunctions.
In the case of important unforeseen negative externalities,
governments can reclaim authority anytime, notably taking advantage of
the elusive nature of the concept of “public interest.”73 For instance, the
recent Legal Services Act in England challenges the earlier unfettered
power of the Law Society of England and Wales to regulate the legal
profession. A new oversight regulator, the Legal Services Board (LSB), is
created to serve as a single, independent, and publicly accountable regulator
with the power to enforce high standards in the legal sector and oversee the
approved regulators such as the Law Society. Approved regulators are now
obliged to distinguish among representative and regulatory functions. The Act
also creates an Office of Legal Complaints (OLC), which removes handling
of complaints by the legal profession in order to restore consumer
confidence that complaints are handled independently and without selfinterest; that they are handled efficiently, fairly and quickly.74 In 2010, the
OLC established the Legal Ombudsman, who is in charge of complaints
against lawyers in England and Wales. The dispute resolution services
offered are free of charge, in principle. In 2014-15 alone, the Ombudsman
services helped resolve about 7,500 complaints.75

71. Cf. Grainne de Búrca, Robert Keohane & Charles Sabel, Global Experimentalist
Governance, 44(3) BRIT. J. POLIT. SCI. 477 (2014).
72. One of the OECD best practices in regulating professional services suggests that
professional associations should not be granted exclusive jurisdiction and rather be subject
to independent (probably state-centered) scrutiny in making decisions about entrance
requirements, mutual recognition, or the boundary of their exclusive rights. See OECD
Summary Report of the Study on Globalisation and Innovation in the Business Services
Sector, at 16 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/55/38619867.pdf.
73. See Mike Feintuck, Regulatory Rationales beyond the Economic: In Search of the
Public Interest, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 39, 45 (Richard Baldwin et al.,
eds., 2010).
74. UK Ministry of Justice, Legal Services Bill – Regulatory Impact Assessment, 10
(2006), http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/legalservicesbill.htm.
75. Over one fifth of these complaints relates to residential conveyancing. See The
Office for Legal Complaints/Legal Ombudsman, Annual Report and Accounts for the Year
Ending 31 March 2015 (2016), http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/Annual-Report-2014-15.pdf.

20

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 40:1

Similar concerns in Australia led the government to step in to
essentially end self-regulation in the legal profession. This was, for
instance, the case through the Queensland Legal Profession Act of 2007.
More recently, it appears that Australia has moved towards co-regulation
that distinguishes between regulatory and representative functions of the
Bar, while relying on the integrated involvement of government, the legal
profession and the courts.76 Although these changes were initially backed
up by all territories, in the end, only two Australian jurisdictions decided to
move forward with sweeping reforms in the legal sector. In July 2015,
New South Wales and Victoria (accounting for approximately 80 percent
of practising lawyers in Australia) started applying the Legal Profession
Uniform Law,77 which creates a Legal Services Council as the overseeing
body, but resolutely moves towards principles-based regulation of the legal
profession with clearly established regulatory objectives, a first for the
Australian legal sector. Day-to-day regulation remains with the
relevant regulatory bodies such as the Law Council of Australia (for
solicitors) and the Australian Bar Association (for barristers). The
Office of the Legal Services Commissioner is in charge of complaints
against lawyers based on the Uniform Law Application Act of 2014 .
Divergences in regulatory approaches affect the degree of influence of
professional associations on the making of rules that affect them.
The situation, including the issue of enforcing professional
obligations against wrongdoers, becomes more complex once self-regulation
of a given profession becomes borderless at the transnational level. Issues of
jurisdiction and conflict surface and, quite astonishingly, their complexity
nourishes the evolution of transnational regulation and private ordering. As a
rule, professions dislike public rules and governmental intervention. This
should not be taken to mean that the rules created by private bodies have a
different starting point than that of public rules: They both aim to create “social
order by focusing or channelling the diverse, arbitrary, even chaotic motives or
actions of individuals into a few socially privileged alleys by making
compliance a normative demand.”78 To be sure, compliance may be ensured
through different avenues and at a varying degree.

76. Paul Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer Guidance and
Regulation of the Legal Profession, JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 165, 166 (2010).
77. The Uniform Law Framework consists of various sets of rules. See Legal Services
Council, Uniform Law, http://www.legalservicescouncil.org.au/Pages/uniform-rules/unif
orm-rules.aspx.
78. See Marietta Auer, The Anti-Network. A Comment on Annelise Riles, 56 AM. J.
COMP. LAW 631, 636-7 (2008).
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C. Trade in Professional Services – The WTO and the
Manifold Preferential Trade Agreements
One notable exception where the interests of professionals meet those of
their governments seems to be the work undertaken by the WTO regarding
progressive liberalization of market access in professional services.
Professional services were among the first sectors that the WTO negotiators
identified as a priority in the 1990s. Professional services had already been
tackled in a working group that was established on May 11, 1990, during the
Uruguay Round negotiations, along with working groups on financial,
transport, and tourism services.79 At the end of the Uruguay Round in 1995, a
Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS) was created whose mandate
was twofold: First, it was instructed to examine and recommend any possible
disciplines, which would ensure that measures regarding qualifications,
licensing, and technical standards do not unduly distort trade in professional
services. Second, as a matter of priority, the WPPS had to concentrate on the
elaboration of multilateral disciplines on the accountancy sector to give
operational effect to specific commitments under the GATS.
Work on accountancy sector was completed on December 14, 1998,
with the adoption by the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) of the
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (“the
accountancy disciplines”).80 The accountancy disciplines do not tackle the
substantive content of qualifications or standards in accountancy. Setting
the level of qualifications or the content of technical standards of any kind
to be required of suppliers of accountancy services essentially remains a
prerogative for each Member or the delegated national authority.
Nevertheless, these disciplines do envisage, for the most part, the need to
ensure procedural transparency in matters of licensing and qualification.
The disciplines are not yet binding and the current Doha Round stalemate
renders their entry into force uncertain.
Within the broad range of professional services, the decision to start
with accountancy services was intentional. Two factors are regarded as
determinative in this choice: First, the relevant industry had a great interest
in the development of a sector that was expanding rapidly worldwide and
was deemed a crucial infrastructural element of financial services. Already
79. JV. Reyna, Services in VOL II: COMMENTARY, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) at 2373, (Terence Stewart ed., 1993).
80. Council for Trade in Services, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the
Accountancy Sector, WTO Doc. S/L/64 (1998).
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during the Uruguay Round, the United States had proposed the endorsement
of an Annex on Professional Accountancy Services.81 The second factor
relates to the level of integration that the accountancy services demonstrated at
that point of time, which was considerable if compared to other professional
services.82 In preparing those rules on accountancy, the WTO had to consult
with several international organizations such as the International Federation
of Accountants (IFAC), the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO). This was also very helpful for the WPPS work relating to the
preparation of the voluntary Guidelines for Mutual Recognition
Agreements (MRAs) in the Accountancy Sector,83 which matched work
that is also done in the relevant international organizations. On the other
side, the WPPS preferred not to intermingle with standardization issues in
this field, which are dealt with elsewhere.84
The successor of the WPPS, the Working Party on Domestic
Regulation (WPDR) has also been tasked with building bridges with
international professional associations to examine the possibility of
applying the accountancy disciplines to other professions as well.85 Several
professional associations reacted positively or critically.86 Their reaction,
however, shows that they believe in the multilateral process and the
necessity of this type of public rules that couple their efforts towards
further integration within their profession in a globalized world.87 For
81. Working Group on Professional Services, Note on the Meeting of 3-4 October 1990,
GATT MTN.GNS.PROF/W/2 (1990).
82. Cf.Working Party on Professional Services, Functions of the Working Party on
Professional Services in Relation to Accountancy, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 4, WTO
Doc. S/WPPS/W/1 (1995).
83. Working Party on Professional Services, Guidelines for Mutual Recognition
Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy Sector, WTO Doc.
S/WPPS/W/12/Rev.1 (1997). See also Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for
Mutual Recognition Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy Sector , WTO
Doc. S/L/38 (1997).
84. Singapore WTO Ministerial, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996). According to Trachtman, this statement “signals the WTO’s
deference and, in effect, delegation (at least in part), to these organizations. Thus, the
WTO has ‘delegated’ to specific functional organizations the task of establishing
standards to facilitate the free movement of accountancy services.” Joel Trachtman,
Accounting Standards and Trade Disciplines – Irreconcilable Differences?, 31:6 J.
WORLD TRADE 70 (1997).
85. Members were also asked to consult with domestic professional associations on
the same matter.
86. See Working Party on Domestic Regulation – Results of Secretariat
Consultations with International Professional Services Associations JOB(03)/126,
(June 25, 2003) (Informal Note by the Secretariat).
87. The fact that the GATS also applies to rules promulgated by self-regulating bodies may
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instance, in 2003, the Council of the International Bar Association (IBA)
adopted a resolution in support of a system of terminology for legal
services for the purposes of international trade negotiations, but also
general principles for the establishment and regulation of foreign lawyers.88
At the regional level, professional services were part of the trade
agenda from early on. For instance, already in the U.S. - Canada Free
Trade Agreement of 1988, and subsequently in NAFTA in 1994,89 there were
provisions regulating trade in professional services. An Annex on Professional
Services incorporates provisions relating to transparency, the development of
international standards, temporary licensing and review procedures.
Nowadays, virtually all regional trade agreements are aimed at advancing
trade in professional services, as they play a very important role as inputs
of other services and generate important value added. Negotiation of
MRAs can be a particularly useful tool in this regard. In NAFTA, for
instance, MRAs were approved for engineers and architects. In both cases,
professional regulatory bodies came together to liberalize practice across
borders in USA, Canada and Mexico within the spirit of NAFTA Chapter
16. According to the tripartite MRA:90
Architects registered in a jurisdiction are required to
follow the laws and codes in force in each jurisdiction
in which they have been authorized to practice. Architects
practicing outside their own country under this agreement are
limited to providing those services that local architects are
permitted to provide and will only provide those services they
customarily provide in their own country if less than those
services permitted in the host jurisdiction.
By the same token, in ASEAN an MRA allows engineers to move
freely in the territories of the ASEAN signatories provided that they satisfy
the requirements for acquiring the title of the ASEAN Chartered
Professional Engineer (ACPE). There are also agreements that are based
on the concept that a person recognized in one country as attaining the

also be a factor that calls for the proactive involvement of professional associations.
88. Council for Trade in Service, Legal Services, WTO Doc. S/C/W/318 (2010).
89. Professional services were ostensibly included in the agenda because of the architectural
profession. This resulted in an annex proposing that the architectural professions in Canada and
the U.S.A. work towards the establishment of similar standards vis-à-vis accreditation,
internships, examinations and ethics. See OECD International Trade in Professional and
Educational Services: Implications for the Professions and Higher Education, at 4 (2001).
90. Tri-National Mutual Recognition Agreement for International Practice, art. 3.3, Oct. 7, 2005.
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agreed international standard of competence should only be minimally
assessed (mainly for local knowledge) before obtaining registration in
another country party to the agreement. Such agreements are the APEC
Engineer Agreement and the Engineers Mobility Forum Agreement. Both
agreements are largely administered by engineering bodies. This underlines
time and again the role of private actors in the regulation of professions at a
supranational level.
More recently, the chapter relating to trade in services within the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) included an Annex on Professional Services.91
Interestingly, the TPP parties have included only two Annexes in the chapter of
the agreement relating to services, the other one being in the area of express
delivery services.
TPP Parties have agreed to the creation of a Professional Services
Working Group.92 With respect to architectural and engineering services,
the agreement refers to the APEC Engineer and Architect frameworks,
respectively, and calls for the creation of MRAs. Interestingly, following
the NAFTA model, the TPP encourages the implementation of temporary
or project-specific licensing and registration procedures based on the
home country titles and licenses. With respect to legal services, the TPP
recognizes the importance of transnational legal services for trade and
investment and in promoting economic growth and business confidence.
According to TPP, foreign lawyers should be able to practice the law of
their home jurisdiction abroad and participate in commercial arbitration,
conciliation or mediation proceedings.
The open-ended list of
possibilities for transnational supply of legal services and the scope of
cooperation with domestic lawyers appears quite broad.
Thus,
cooperation of the regulating bodies will be of dire need. The role of the
Working Group is indeed to support the professional bodies in liaising
with one another. Progress should be discussed annually. Similar
mechanisms are to be expected in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). The EU has proposed, for instance, the creation of a
Committee on the Recognition of Professional Qualification, but again,
no tangible results will be yielded without the active participation of
professional bodies.

91. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Annex 10-A Agreed on Jan. 26, 2016, https://
www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/10.-Cross-Border-Trade-inServices-Chapter.pdf? [hereinafter TPP Final Text].
92. See TPP Final Text, supra note 91, at art. 10.9.
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IV. The Transnational Dimension of Regulating Professional
Services
A. Two-Dimensional Transnational Private Regulation of
Professional Services
Transnational law of professional services is a dynamic process with
strong normative characteristics led by predominantly private actors.93 The
transnational dimension in professional services should be examined at two
different levels. The first refers to the level of firm; more specifically, large
professional service firms that are active in supplying accountancy and
auditing, legal, management consulting, and advertising services worldwide.
Foreign earnings of those firms sometimes surpass domestic revenues.
International operations of such large firms are typically organized as loose
collections of rather autonomous, locallyowned partnerships.
These
partnerships are linked to an international organism that may have coordinating
responsibilities, among others.
As business strategies become more
intertwined and companies strive for higher returns through diversification,
market boundaries faint. For instance, large accounting firms regularly
provide management advisory services, whereas internationally active law
firms equally are active in areas of tax and trust and estates, very much like
accounting firms. This is not an exclusively developed-country phenomenon;
rather, the quest for new markets leads firms to seek market shares in the
developing world as well, where concentration of power to few may be easier
due to the weaknesses of domestic market structures and antitrust law.
In other cases, professional services have been traditionally
interconnected (or in certain cases, vertically integrated), sometimes
displaying characteristics of complementarity. This is the case of
architectural and engineering services, along with construction services.
Architectural firms prepare blueprints and designs for buildings, whereas
engineering firms provide services relating to planning, design,
construction and management for buildings, installations, civil engineering
works and industrial processes. Consulting engineers, on the other hand,
may work hand in hand with architects from the very early stage of a
project.94 Research is still at its infancy when it comes to deciphering the
interrelations among various professional services and the function of so-

93. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996).
94. Cf. Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat:
Architectural Sevices, WTO Doc.S/C.W303, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2009).
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called “professional service supply chains.”95
The second level relates to professional associations. Internationalization of
business gave rise to the creation of international professional bodies that
promote the adoption of business-friendly rules transcending national frontiers to
the benefit of professionals. Individual professionals are only indirectly
represented in these attempts, as their voices are heard exclusively at the level of
each national professional association. In turn, international professional
associations consist predominantly of a group of national associations. In this
sense, rule-making of international professional associations raises questions of
good governance similar to rule-making of international organizations.
However, there may also be associations that follow a more representative or
mixed form of organization. For instance, the legal profession at the global level
is represented not only by the IBA, which is closer to the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition, but also by the International Union of Lawyers (Union Internationale
des Avocats – UIA). The UIA claims to be the most representative international
association of lawyers in Europe, South America and Africa. Thus, already in
this area of professional services, elements of fragmentation alluding to possible
conflicts and overlaps are present. For our purposes here, it bears noting that
both bodies have international coverage and their membership includes national
professional associations and individual lawyers.96

B. The International Professional Associations
Although the creation of professional associations at the international
level has traditionally improved cooperation and exchange of information
in various professions, notably on issues such as education, professional
qualifications and international standards, this phenomenon has intensified
due to the globalization of business. As business expands beyond national
borders, professional service suppliers equally expand their spectrum of
activity. However, supply of professional services at a transnational level
can be hampered by various impediments notably of regulatory nature.
The need to facilitate access and enhance convergence with respect to
applicable rules, but also to capture activities national laws cannot, led to
the creation of sectoral non-governmental organizations at the international
level. Furthermore, as the locus of legal services supply shifts at the global

95. These are defined as systematic sequences of professional, clerical, and technical
services explicitly set up to provide specific services, such as producing a financial product,
designing a house, or replacing a hip. See Jean Harvey, Professional Service Supply Chains,
42-43 J. OPER. MANAG. 52 (2016).
96. Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat: Legal Services, WTO
Doc. S/C/W/43, at 18 (1998).
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level, the public interest dimension of the practice of law faints, leading
benevolent professionals in efforts to ensure the quality of the legal
services even at the global level.97 We discuss the main features of these
organizations in the areas of law, engineering, and architecture in turn.
As a prelude, a common characteristic of these regimes is their
fragmented way of functioning with high levels of overlap and low levels
of active coordination. Most of these organizations have adopted rules relating
to professional competence, consumer protection, and the protection of public
interest; thereby, showing awareness of professional services having
characteristics similar to experience goods, i.e., significant information
asymmetries. Such rules are typically incorporated in a model code of
ethics, which is intended to inspire domestic professional associations
when they prepare or revise their code of conduct. Accreditation and
(continued) education is an emerging area of significant interaction among
international associations of a given profession and other international
organizations or entities. Such initiatives can potentially lead to mutual
recognition, recognition of equivalent qualifications, and ultimately increased
mobility. Thus, significant legal material is produced and epitomizes a range
of degrees of legal formality; both “soft” and “harder” law seems to be
generated. In that sense, international professional associations constitute
embryonic transnational legal orders.98

i. Legal Services
The legal sector plays an enabling role in the economy. It is no
coincidence that every new Member that joined the WTO in the aftermath
of the Uruguay Round, including China, inscribed commitments in legal
services in its schedule of services commitments. The legal sector has
experienced steady growth in recent years, following the growth of
international trade and the development of new fields of practice, notably
in the area of business and commercial law. Legal firms around the globe
are internationalizing their activities to serve better clients engaged in
activities of a transnational nature. The profession has become global and
lawyers are increasingly required to conduct transactions that cross national
borders and involve several jurisdictions. It is the demand for legal services
that can go beyond national borders that drives the increasing interest of the
legal professionals in the expansion of their possibilities for unhindered
97. See also Cristopher Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means
Business, 27(2) PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 465 (2008).
98. See generally, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence Halliday & Gregory
Shaffer, eds., 2015).
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international mobility. Multi-jurisdictional advice and fully integrated
services covering all aspects of a business transaction are increasingly
sought after by multinationals. Such phenomena lead to important
structural shifts in the legal market at the national and global levels.99
Having said this, the regulation of the legal profession is still carried
out predominantly at the level of political subdivisions rather than at the
national level. Thus, authority for admission to the profession and
professional discipline often is in the hands of local, state or provincial organs,
be it governmental or professional (in the latter case, through delegation, as
noted earlier). Such fragmentation of regulating the legal profession is often
the result of rent-seeking.100 The superiority of self-regulation in the legal
profession has been questioned based on competition law grounds at least
in the OECD countries, whereby a transition towards separate independent
“umbrella regulators” who focus on the market at the macrolevel (rather
than the individual service supplier) seems to be taking place.101
Important initiatives have been taken at the transnational level to
reduce fragmentation of rules relating, for instance, to corporate structure
or double deontology (referring to the obligation of foreign lawyers to
comply with both the home and host country code of conduct). One of the
most interesting issues on this score relates to restrictions regarding
advertising. For instance, in the host country, contrary to the home
country, advertising of legal services may be prohibited. Such rules may
be applying in a discriminatory manner. For instance, in Denmark, foreign
lawyers face restrictions on advertising that do not apply to local lawyers.
Significant progress has been made under the auspices of the
International Bar Association (IBA) with respect to better transnational
regulation of the legal profession worldwide. The IBA is a federation of
national bar associations and law societies based in New York. It is a truly
international organization with about 200 national professional organizations
and 40,000 individual lawyers as registered members. The IBA Council,
where representatives from Bar Associations sit, is IBA’s governing body.
According to the constitution of the IBA, the IBA aims, inter alia, to
(i) establish and maintain relations and exchanges between Bar
Associations and their members worldwide; (ii) assist in the development

99. See also Deborah Jones Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010? Empirical
Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, MICH. STATE L. REV. 1043 (2015).
100. See Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 64, 291 (1974).
101. See also Alison Hook, Sectoral Study on the Impact of Domestic Regulation on Trade in
Legal Services, 13 (2007), (OECD/World Bank Sixth Services Experts Meeting on Domestic
Regulation and Trade in Professional Services).
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and improvement of the profession’s organization and status worldwide;
(iii) promote uniformity and definition in appropriate fields of law; and (iv)
promote the administration of justice under the rule of law globally.102 To
achieve these objectives, the IBA undertook significant work adopting
resolutions and producing guidelines related to such diverse areas as ethical
standards, conflicts of interest, taking of evidence and party representation
in international arbitration; the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments for collective redress; multidisciplinary practices; money
laundering; standards and criteria for recognition of lawyers’ qualifications;
or the regulation of foreign lawyers.103 Notably, two resolutions of the IBA
on General Principles for the Establishment and Regulation of Foreign
Lawyers (adopted in June 1998) and the resolution in Support of a System
of Terminology for Legal Services for the Purposes of International Trade
Negotiations (adopted in September 2003) provide reference points on the
regulation of foreign lawyers advocating the adoption of either a full licensing
approach or a limited licensing approach or an appropriate combination of both
with a view to facilitating legal practice around the world.
The IBA International Code of Ethics was first adopted in 1956. The
latest edition dates back to 1988. The code is not binding on the members
of the IBA and applies to any lawyer of one jurisdiction in relation to his
contracts with a lawyer of another jurisdiction or to his activities in another
jurisdiction. The code includes rules on ethical standards that are common
to most countries on matters such as honour and dignity, independence,
courtesy and fairness to colleagues, financial diligence, conflicts of interest,
contingency fees, unauthorised practice of law, professional liability,
disclosure of confidential information, confidentiality of lawyer-client
communications, respect towards the courts, advertisement and solicitation,
handling, refusal and withdrawal from cases and out of court settlements. It also
includes a rule that binds lawyers who undertake work in a jurisdiction where
they are not full members of the local profession to the ethical rules of the host
country, as well as to those of their home country. The IBA may bring incidents
of alleged violation of the code to the attention of relevant organizations.
In addition, the IBA adopted a ‘Guide for Establishing and
Maintaining Complaints and Discipline Procedures’ to assist national
associations in the creation or revision of their complaints and discipline
procedures. The Guide makes a logical link with the Code of Conduct in

102. See International Bar Association Constitution, art. 1 (May 28, 2011),
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=D1E3CF28-BE59-4FC6-96EB4E40156C19CE.
103. For a list of the IBA resolutions, see IBA guides, rules and other free materials,
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx.
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that the implementation of complaints procedures depends on the clarity of
the rules enshrined in the Code of Conduct. The Guide emphasizes the
need for adequately informing the consumers of the possibility of lodging a
complaint; allowing easy, public access to information relating to
complaints; setting specific timelines for handling complaints; and giving
the opportunity to respond to the lawyer concerned. The Guide envisages a
disciplinary framework, whereby the complainant has access to a complaint
handling body, which, if the complaint is well-substantiated, refers the
matter to a disciplinary tribunal. Decisions of the latter shall be appealed
before an appeal tribunal. All three bodies are to be fair, impartial and
independent and may, but need not necessarily, contain nonlawyers.
Thus, the Guide promotes an extra-judicial mechanism that is to run in
parallel with public courts, but crucially does not require the participation of
non-lawyers. For instance, participation of judges or notaries (at least, in those
jurisdictions where notaries are deemed agents of the public interest) could be
a more valuable guarantee of independence.104 According to the Guide, the
following penalties could be imposed to the lawyer: (a) reprimand; (b) fine
and/or restitution order; (c) suspension or revocation of license to practice; (d)
additional courses or further education of the respondent; (e) restricting the
lawyer’s licence to practice.
With over 200 Bar Associations and several thousand individual
members, the International Union of Lawyers (UIA) has similar objectives and
membership.
UIA equally adopted resolutions relating to issues of
professional conduct, foreign legal practice, professional secrecy and
multidisciplinary practices.105 The UIA’s ‘Turin Principles of Professional
Conduct for the Legal Profession on the 21st Century’ of 2002 provide:

C. Role of and Representation by the Bar
Depending on the country, a Lawyer has the duty or
the right to be a member of a Bar or Law Society and
to ensure that the profession is governed by rules laid
down by the representative bodies of which he or she
is a member, and that they are observed.
Provided that the Bar observes the principles set out
104. Cf. Case C-506/04, Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, ¶4362, 2006 E.C.R. I-8613, (the Court cast doubts as to the impartiality of a disciplinary body
which is composed exclusively by lawyers).
105. See International Association for Lawyers, Resolutions and Charters, http://www.uianet.
org/en/documentation/resolutions (last accessed on Apr. 15, 2016).
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in the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
endorsed by the UN, 106 Lawyers have the duty to
recognise the Bar’s right to establish such rules and
to ensure compliance by conforming their conduct to
the rules laid down by their own Bar and those of the
other jurisdictions in which they practise.
The UIA has further adopted in 2002 a set of ‘Standards for
Lawyers Establishing a Legal Practice Outside Their Home Country’
which provides, inter alia, for compliance of foreign lawyers with host
country rules of ethics and implies that the host country regulatory
authority should, through the registration of the foreign lawyer, have all
available information to determine and enforce compliance with
applicable standards.

i. Engineering Services
Contrary to the legal sector, engineering has been less bothered with
securing complete regulatory authority. This is because engineers typically
work as employees of private companies, notably due to the need for
significant capital investment.107 However, the emergence of other nongovernmental international professional organizations has influenced
developments in this profession as well. The World Federation of
Engineering Organizations (WFEO) consists of over 90 national and 10
regional members representing some 20 million engineers. It has ten
standing committees hosted in various countries worldwide. In 2001, the
WFEO adopted a model code of ethics to define and support the creation of
similar codes in member institutions. Interestingly, the Code comes with an
interpretation of the Code of Ethics. The Code’s introductory text provided:
These governing principles of the Code of Ethics are
usually presented either as broad guiding principles of
an idealistic or inspirational nature, or, alternatively, as
a detailed and specific set of rules couched in legalistic
or imperative terms to make them more enforceable.
Professions that have been given the privilege and

106. The text refers here to the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the
8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Havana, Cuba, August 27, September 7, 1990.
107. Rostain, supra note 60, at 173.
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responsibility of self regulation, including the
engineering profession, have tended to opt for the first
alternative, espousing sets of underlying principles as
codes of professional ethics which form the basis and
framework for responsible professional practice.
Arising from this context, professional codes of ethics
have sometimes been incorrectly interpreted as a set of
“rules” of conduct intended for passive observance. A
more appropriate use by practicing professionals is to
interpret the essence of the underlying principles within
their daily decision-making situations in a dynamic
manner, responsive to the need of the situation. As a
consequence, a code of professional ethics is more than a
minimum standard of conduct; rather, it is a set of
principles which should guide professionals in their daily
work. (Emphasis added).
The most recent WFEO Model Code of Ethics confirms the twofold
objective of a model code of ethics, that is, protect the public, but also the
engineering practitioners from provisions that may restrain commercial
activity. In addition, it identifies four objectives for any code of ethics in
engineering: integrity, competence, leadership, and sustainability.108 More
generally, sustainability has become an increasingly important issue for
WFEO to the extent that a Model Code of Practice for sustainable
development and environmental stewardship was adopted in September
2013. On the occasion of the Paris conference on climate change, WFEO
reflected on the role of engineers in a low-carbon economy. At this
juncture, it adopted a Model Code of Practice on Principles of Climate
Change Adaptation for Engineers during the WFEO General Assembly in
December 2015 in Paris. This Code complements the previous two and
evolves around principles relating to professional judgment, integration of
climate information, and guidance on practice.
Sustainability-related global rules in engineering are growing in
prominence, notably due to the globalization of supply chains.109 As

108. For the latest version of the Model Code of the World Federation of Engineering
Organizations, see http://www.wfeo.org/wp-content/uploads/WFEO_MODEL_CODE_OF_
ETHICS_Final.pdf (last accessed on Apr. 22, 2016).
109. See also Meredith Miller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Working Conditions in
the Global Supply Chain – Accountability through Transparency in Private Ordering, in
THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE – MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 432
(Jena Martin & Karen Bravo eds., 2016).
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production is outsourced, leveling the playing field in supplying
engineering services is necessary, as the recent collapse of the eight-story
Rana Plaza building dramatically demonstrates.110 Such tragic events also
emphasize the need for more regular checks by Western investors of facilities,
buildings and infrastructure that is used for their production, perhaps through
commissioning engineers from their home countries. In addition, growing
internationalization calls for more convergence regarding educational
standards and professional qualifications.
Since the 1980s, national institutions and other associations have
attempted to establish systems for accrediting engineering courses and
assessing the professional competence of engineers for independent
practice. The most well-known examples of this cooperation include the
Washington Accord, which is a constitutive part of the International
Engineering Alliance (IEA). The Washington Accord is an early example
of a reciprocal agreement that was reached by engineering organisations
representing Australia, Canada, Ireland, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Malaysia, the
United Kingdom and the United States. In 2014, Sri Lanka and India
joined the Accord. The Accord recognises the equivalency of the national
accreditation mechanisms in these countries and thus graduates in these
countries are considered as having met the academic requirements for entry
to the practice of engineering.111 Other parts of the education of engineers
are covered by the Sydney Accord (engineering technologists or
incorporated engineers), signed in 2001, and the Dublin Accord
(engineering technician), signed in 2002.
Other examples of cooperation include the European Federation of
National Engineering Organizations (FEANI), the Engineers Mobility Forum
and the APEC Engineer Monitoring Committee. These constitute a global
network working on standards for engineering degrees and professional
engineering practice.112 For instance, FEANI adopted standards and rules
relating to the assessment of competence of professional engineers with a
view to increase mobility of engineers in Europe. Notably the Engineers
Mobility Forum agreement created the framework for the establishment of
an international standard of competence for professional engineering. This
110. Jim Yardley, Justice Still Elusive in Factory Disasters in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2013.
111. See Washington Accord, IEA, http://www.ieagreements.org/Washington-Accord/ (last
accessed on May 15, 2016); also John Mallea, “International Trade in Professional and
Educational Services: Implications for the Professions and Higher Education,” at 4-5, (1998).
112. Cf. Peter Greenwood, WFEO, Mobility of Engineering Professionals, Information Paper
on Mobility Prepared for the WFEO Standing Committee on Education and Training (CET) (Oct.
20, 2008).
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Forum was repealed by the International Professional Engineers Agreement
(IPEA), a multinational, open agreement with the same critical objective as
the previous Forum.113 The standard applied is the same as the APEC
Engineer Agreement. However, non-APEC members, such as the United
Kingdom or Ireland, are parties to the IPEA. WFEO, in turn, has been
working on the preparation of a policy on accreditation of courses and
mobility of engineering professionals, which would complement the abovementioned initiatives.
There are other international organizations that are concurrently active in
promoting the engineering profession. Most notably, the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which has over 400,000 members in 160
countries and covers electrical and electronics engineers, or the International
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), which focuses entirely on
consulting firms. The World Council of Civil Engineers focuses on civil
engineers who represent around 50 percent of all engineering organizations
worldwide. The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), although established in the
UK, represents about 90,000 members from more than 160 countries worldwide.
One interesting aspect of the above-mentioned international initiatives
is that they have adopted codes of conduct, which, other than making
reference to education, competence and integrity of the engineers,
underscore the importance of combating corruption in the profession,
particularly in the materialization of construction projects. For instance,
FIDIC has prepared and encourages the implementation of an ‘Integrity
Management System’, focusing on preventive action to fight corruption.
Guidelines in this regard were first adopted in 2001. In 2006, FIDIC
adopted similar guidelines specific to government procurement. In 2011,
the first edition of policies and principles regarding the FIDIC Integrity
Management System (FIMS) was published. 114
ICE also adopted a Code of Professional Conduct, violation of
which may lead to disciplinary action against a given member. The ICE
disciplinary mechanism includes the Professional Conduct Panel and the
Disciplinary Board. The former is in charge of investigating all
allegations against ICE Members that are accused of inappropriate
conduct. Serious cases are to be forwarded to the Disciplinary Board
for formal adjudication. According to By-law 40, the Disciplinary
Board can impose the following sanctions: compliance with certain
requirements regarding the member’s future professional or business
113. IEA CONST., available at http://www.ieagreements.org/Agreement-ConstitutionsVersion-1.pdf.
114. See also INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, http://fidic.org/node/777 (last visited
May 4, 2016).
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conduct; fines up to a maximum of £2,000; admonition; severe reprimand;
suspension; and expulsion. According to By-law 41, appeal to an independent
tribunal is possible in theory under certain circumstances.

ii. Architectural Services
The International Union of Architects (UIA) consists of national
associations from 130 countries and territories. It is a federation of
national professional organizations called Member Sections. The UIA
maintains an open electronic database with information about the industry
in each Member Section and in order to assist those architects who
practice their profession at the international level. In this respect, the
UIA has been quite active in the field of facilitating movement of
architects at the international level. In 1999, the UIA General Assembly
unanimously agreed on an Accord on Recommended International
Standards of Professionalism in Architectural Practice and a set of
Recommended Guidelines, which offer a basis for mutual recognition of
architectural competences at the international level. 115 In addition, the
UIA has developed, jointly with UNESCO, a Charter for Architectural
Education, which sets out broad minimum standards. 116 According to
UIA, the latter should be regarded as the minimum criteria for
architectural education.
Previously, the UIA had adopted an International Code of Ethics on
Consulting Services, which should ostensibly constitute “the common
standard of conduct for all professionals performing consulting services
in all nations.” Member Sections are encouraged to introduce into their
own codes of ethics the recommended Accord Guidelines mentioned
earlier and a requirement that their members adhere to the codes of ethics
in force in the host country, provided that they are not prohibited by
international law or the home country laws. Indeed, Article 9 of the Code
provides that the architect delivering professional services abroad shall
abide by the host country’s professional regulation laws and adhere to the
code of ethics that domestic professionals apply. Interestingly, in its
Article 10, the Code provides:
(1) The common objectives of all professional
organizations are to establish and promote the highest
115. Most recently revised in 2014, the Accord is available at: http://www.uia.archi/sites
/default/files/AIAS075164.pdf (last accessed on May 2, 2016).
116. The most recent revised version can be found at: http://www.uia.archi/sites/
default/files/charte-en.pdf (last accessed on May 2, 2016).
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standards of ethical conduct and excellence in the
practice of the professions, to regulate the professional
conduct of the members of the professions and to
cooperate with their allied professional organizations.
(2) In line with the foregoing objectives, it shall be
mandatory upon a professional organization to take
appropriate action on any formal complaint for unethical
conduct filed against any member of its profession by a coprofessional, a client, a professional organization or a
government regardless of the residence of the
complainant. (Emphasis added).
At the national level, the Accord encourages the creation of
professional bodies if they do not exist. It further underlines the
importance for these bodies to adhere to the UIA international standards,
the UNESCO-UIA requirements, and the UIA Code of Ethics. Such bodies
should be governed in an open and transparent manner and are expected to
promote the interests of consumers, architects, and the general public.
The Accord and Recommended Guidelines are deemed nonbinding
documents for the consideration of the individual national Member
Sections, and the UIA cannot enforce those documents. However, their
influence is apparent. For instance, Korea expanded the required
architectural education from four to five years; the Architects’ Council of Europe
revised their recommended Code of Ethics based on the UIA mode; and the
MRA relating to architects under NAFTA uses the definition of architect
included in the UIA Accord.117 In addition, UIA was one of the few
international professional associations to submit a proposal for a WTO GATS
Annex on Domestic Regulation to allow for the dismantlement of unnecessarily
excessive barriers to trade in professional/architectural services.118

V. Private Enforcement and Judicial Review
Private enforcement has been a pervasive feature of the existing social
and economic system for several decades. Whereas the State assists by
establishing and maintaining a court system, the most important part of
117. See Russell Keune, “Architectural Services in Global Trade in Professional Services,”
paper presented at the OECD/World Bank Sixth Services Experts Meeting on Domestic
Regulation and Trade in Professional Services, at 24, (Feb. 2007).
118. See the proposal of 2006 at: http://www.ace-cae.eu/uploads/tx_jidocumentsview/A
G207UIADomreg.pdf (last accessed on May 2, 2016).
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enforcement is informal, also driven by the “latent threat of withdrawing
future business from the violator.”119 Enforcement of private rules in
professional services reveals an interaction of bodies, be it public, private
or hybrid.
In professional services in which self-regulation has
traditionally prevailed, such as the legal profession, the creation of
disciplinary bodies consisting mainly of fellow professionals is common.
It is in a second step and in more significant cases of professional
misconduct that the participation of a “public authority” representative,
such as a judge, occurs. In other cases, referral of the entire case to a public
court may be stipulated in the statute of a given professional organization. For
instance, the rules of a given professional association may offer the possibility of
appeal to ordinary courts against certain decisions made by disciplinary bodies of
the association. In other cases, notably claims raised by consumers, it is public
courts that will be deciding on issues of fault and liability. Finally, once the
remedy of having recourse to the disciplinary bodies of a given professional
association is exhausted, recourse to the ordinary judicial system is always open
for the person negatively affected. As mentioned earlier in the case of the UK,
the State in certain cases may prefer to delegate the most insignificant cases to
special agencies that oversee the work and activities of the professional bodies.
Initially regarded as an intervention in the matters of professional
associations, judicial review of decisions by private professional associations
became a standard procedure in case of continued complaints. This can happen
even after the exhaustion of disciplinary processes within a given professional
association, notably with regard to the imposition of sanctions and the admission
to the profession. In both cases, the notion of public interest and antitrust-related
considerations are important issues for the State to keep an eye on. Judicial
review in this case would entail a balance between incommensurables whereby
judges ultimately make implicit value judgments.
When a given situation is treated by the disciplinary body of a given
professional association, it seems that the enforcement pyramid becomes
relevant.120 Regulatory approaches would begin at the bottom of the pyramid for
low-profile cases necessitating a warning or soft forms of notice, and escalate
towards the imposition of fines and/or incapacitation in response to compliance
failures. According to Ayres and Braithwaite,121 governments should allow selfregulation to industries in the first instance, but the State should move on through
enforced self-regulation to command regulation with (discretionary and
119. William Landes & Richard Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1975).
120. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION – TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 38 (Oxford University. Press 1995).
121. Id.
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subsequently with nondiscretionary) punishment if the goals are not met. Thus,
the regulator shall be able to move up and down the pyramid or even recover the
regulatory power that had been delegated to a professional association depending
on the gravity of the situation. This last element can also be part of a metaregulation approach, whereby governmental authorities deliberately seek to
induce private bodies to develop their internal self-regulatory responses to
challenges.122 However, an overemphasis on punitive strategies can render
voluntary compliance at the bottom of the pyramid impossible.123

A. Legal Services
Private enforcement in the legal profession entails, for the most part,
the implementation of legal ethics rules against misconduct or fraudulent
and deceptive practices of lawyers. Typically, codes of ethics would entail
a series of sanctions, which, depending on the type of behaviour and
severity of the offense, would escalate up to the level of indefinite
expulsion from the Bar. Sanctions more often than not include: admonition,
reprimand, censure, suspension from practice, or disbarment. Admonition is
usually a private discipline, whereas reprimand can be private or public.
Censure, suspension and disbarment are public disciplinary sanctions.
In the United States, self-regulation in the legal profession co-exists
with state regulation. Codes of ethics are typically enforced by the
respective state’s supreme courts, which have acted as the ultimate
gatekeepers. Thus, rules of professional conduct in the legal profession are
in the end considered as rules of the supreme court of a given state, and
thus applied under the aegis of the state judiciary.124 However, in practice,
such rules have been prepared by the state bar and are typically based on
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct set out by the American Bar
Association (ABA). In several states, disbarment, which is the most severe
sanction, can be decided only by the state’s supreme court.125
Nonetheless, the rest of the sanctions have been traditionally enforced
by disciplinary agencies that either operate within the judicial branch or are
part of the state bars. Thus, for some time, state bars were in charge of

122. Coglianese & Mendelson, supra note 58, at 147.
123. Richard Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MODERN L. REV.
59 (2008).
124. In general, Supreme Courts have ultimate jurisdiction for admission to the practice of
law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to legal practice. See
for instance, OH Const. art. §4.02(B)(1)(g).
125. It bears noting that disbarment is not necessarily permanent, as reinstatement is
possible in some states.
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conducting investigations, holding hearings and imposing a range of
disciplines. This led to the proceedings becoming confidential, somehow
implying that there was no public interest involved in cases brought against
misbehaving lawyers.
However, over the years it became clear that the bars largely failed to
run effective disciplinary mechanisms, with more than 90 percent of
complaints against lawyers being dismissed – sometimes without any
investigation.126 In addition, corporate lawyers became so intertwined with
business that they became subject to federal regulation in important areas
such as securities or taxation. In the case of corporate practice, ethics
regulation is federalized.127 In such areas of significant federal interest,
federal regulation treats corporate lawyers as one of a class of similar
service providers.128
Thus, more open mechanisms have emerged in which, nonetheless,
lawyers, and less the organized state bars, continued to play an essential
role. For instance, in New Jersey, legal ethics issues will first be raised
with one of the seventeen district ethics committees around that state.129
Such committees are composed of three members, two of whom are
lawyers. Decisions of the committees and the Office of Attorney Ethics
can be reviewed before the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) of the
supreme court of New Jersey, which conducts a de novo review. The DRB
consists of nine members appointed by the supreme court.130 Five of them are
attorneys, one member is a retired judge and the remaining three members are
nonlawyer, public members. The Board’s decision must be reviewed by the
state’s supreme court only in the case of a decision recommending disbarment.
According to Rule 1:20-16(b) of the New Jersey Court Rules
Governing Attorney Discipline, in all forms of discipline other than
disbarment, the recommendation of the Board becomes final on entry of an
order by the supreme court, unless the latter grants one of the parties leave
to appeal. The state’s supreme court decision can be appealed before the

126. See Rostain, supra note 60, at 180.
127. This is, for instance, the case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp.
III 2003). For a critical review of lawyers’ objections against such pieces of legislation, see
William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the
Business Lawyer, 75(3) FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2006).
128. see also Laurel Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers.” JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL
LAWYER 189 (2008).
129. Complaints relating to advertising shall be raised with the Attorney Advertising
Committee.
130. Cf ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, more recently
amended in 2002.
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United States Supreme Court. Disciplinary proceedings are public, but all
fee arbitration proceedings are confidential.131
A Random Audit
Compliance Programme is also pursued, which allows the identification of
otherwise unknown attorney misconduct.
The state’s supreme court is free to follow its own argumentation,
whereas the views of the bodies previously dealing with a given case
merely constitute recommendations. For instance, in Zauderer, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claimant that his due process
rights were violated because the Ohio Supreme Court relied on a theory
that was different from the one brought forward by the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline or the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that, under the law
of Ohio, the Board has no authority to impose discipline, but simply
recommend discipline to the state’s supreme court, which is the ultimate
authority responsible for bar discipline according to the Ohio state
constitution (and, obviously under all state constitutions).132
As an alternative to civil litigation, in the state of New Jersey, the
possibility of fee arbitration is offered when there is disagreement with
respect to fees. This programme handled more than 1,795 cases involving
more than $13 million in legal fees in 2014.133 If parties choose this option
instead of civil litigation, they are presumed as bound by the decision of the
arbitrators. Just as with the DRB, most members in this institution are still
attorneys. Typically, the fee arbitrator committee will consist of three
lawyers or two lawyers and one public member.
Although important steps were made to improve the openness of
disciplinary mechanisms, the situation is still regarded as unsatisfactory in
several States.134 Lawyer discipline mechanisms have been criticized for
their lack of transparency at least since the 1970s and this has led to an
increased involvement of the judicial branch as a guarantee of
independence. The ABA McKay Commission, when examining the lawyer
discipline mechanisms, found that “the Commission is convinced that
secrecy in discipline proceedings continues to be the greatest single source
of public distrust of lawyer disciplinary systems.”135 In addition, in several

131. Information on all disciplinary cases since 1984 is to be found at:
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/discipline.htm (last accessed on May 10, 2016).
132. Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655 (1985).
133. See Stuart Rabner & Charles Centinaro, State of the Attorney Disciplinary System
Report 2014, 45.
134. Leslie Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEORGETOWN J. OF
LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2007).
135. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Lawyer Regulation for a
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cases, consumers are not adequately informed of recidivists, who may
actually have been sanctioned several times before they are disbarred, if at
all. Indeed, in New Jersey, several lawyers have received public discipline
in more than one instance.136 In Louisiana, a study suggested that between 1975
and 2000, 85 percent of the disbarred lawyers who applied for reinstatement
succeeded and 44 percent of those lawyers were subsequently disciplined.137
Furthermore, it appears that sanctions are imposed in an unbalanced manner in
that solo or small-firm lawyers are disproportionately prosecuted.
Nowadays, important steps towards increased transparency were
made, with an enhanced involvement of the state judiciary. In California,
for instance, the State Bar investigates complaints of attorney misconduct
and, if necessary, files formal charges with the State Bar Court. This court
consists of independent professional judges and no attorneys are involved.
The State Bar Court has the power to discipline lawyers for lesser offenses
and recommend to the State’s Supreme Court suspension or disbarment for
more serious crimes. Again, the extent to which the disciplinary system is
public varies among states. Complaints against lawyers in Florida, New
Hampshire, Oregon and West Virginia are treated as a matter of public record.
In 2009, over 88,000 complaints were received by the state
disciplinary agencies. However, the majority of the complaints filed were
dismissed after investigation during the same period.138 More than 2,000
lawyers were privately sanctioned, whereas the number of lawyers who
were publicly sanctioned was slightly below 5,000. Thus, sanctions have
become increasingly public, thereby serving an important function of
transparency, openness, and consumer protection from laggards. However,
downsides are also present in that reputation costs can be high, notably for
lawyers who in the end were not disciplined.139
Many times, disciplinary proceedings run in parallel with civil
litigation or criminal proceedings. For instance, In the Matter of Marc F.
Desidario, the New Jersey Supreme Court disbarred Mr. Desiderio as a
result of his criminal conviction by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California. Mr. Desidario was accused of money
laundering, aiming to conceal the operations of a substantial marijuana

New Century: Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, 33 (1992).
136. See Stuart & Rabner, supra note 133, at 18ff.
137. Levin, supra note 134, p. 3 (citing Terry Carter, ‘Bounced from the Bar: Lawyers Who
Lose Their Licenses for Fraud or Other Misconduct Can Win Reinstatement, If They Practice in
the Right State,’ ABA Journal, October 2003, p. 56).
138. ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2014, Charts I and II.
139. In the United States, there is also a website which allows ratings of lawyers. See for
instance: www.lawyerratingz.com.
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distribution organization. The New Jersey Supreme Court temporarily
suspended the attorney, but only after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
commit money laundering before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.140
In Ohralik, a case that was subsequently handled by the United States
Supreme Court,141 at stake was the behaviour of an Ohio lawyer, who
managed, through face-to-face solicitation of two car accident victims, to
sign contingent-fee arrangements with them. Eventually, both victims
discharged the attorney, but he succeeded in obtaining a share of the
driver’s insurance recovery in settlement of his lawsuit against them for
breach of contract. Later, both victims filed grievances with the Ohio State
Bar Association for violation of the rules prohibiting unsolicited
recommendation or acceptance of employment for members of the Bar.142
The Bar’s grievance committee recommended a public reprimand, which
was later endorsed by the Disciplinary Board of the Ohio Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Board’s findings, but
increased the Board’s recommended sanction of a public reprimand to an
indefinite suspension.
In Europe, the structure of disciplinary mechanisms varies. The
CCBE recommends that any disciplinary proceedings in the legal
profession be independent vis-à-vis state authorities. Rather, the primary
responsibility of the conduct of disciplinary proceedings should preferably
lie with the Bar or the Law Society. Having said this, the State may set the
framework within which disciplinary proceedings should function.143
In England and Wales, the Legal Services Act of 2007 constitutes a
major overhaul of the regulation of the legal profession and a dramatic
transformation of the self-regulatory model. The Act permits, inter alia,
nonlawyers to invest in law firms. Thus, UK-based firms can seek outside
capital. In addition, the Act allows the creation of Alternative Business
Structures (ABS),144 alias multidisciplinary practices, whereby lawyers can
join forces with nonlawyers such as accountants or tax consultants.145 By
140. See In the Matter of Desiderio, 927 A.2d 560 (2007) and In the Matter of Desiderio, 963
A.2d 810 (2009).
141. See infra Section III.
142. Rules DR 2-103(A) & DR 2-104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility
(1970).
143. See CCBE Recommendations on Disciplinary Process for Legal Professions,
http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/CCBE_Recommendations1_119
0034926.pf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
144. The Solicitors Regulation Authority licensed the first ABS in March 2012.
145. This is prohibited in the US and in several EU MS. For an early assessment of the
effects on competition that this discrepancy may have, see Anthony Davis, Regulation of the
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2014, over 250 ABSs were licensed in the UK, accounting for a significant
share in the legal market.146
In this new regulatory framework, the Solicitors Regulation Authority
(SRA), established in 2007, is the independent regulatory body of the Law
Society of England and Wales. The new SRA Code of Conduct, adopting
an outcomes-focused regulatory approach, came into force in 2011.
According to the new framework, all authorized legal firms in the UK will
need to appoint compliance officers for legal practice (COLPs, must be
qualified lawyers) and for finance and administration (COFAs, not
necessarily lawyers), who will be responsible for risk management and
proper governance.
In principle, the SRA is the first body that will take up a complaint of
misconduct against a solicitor.147 The SRA has vague standards as to
whether decisions against solicitors will be published or not, depending on
whether publication promotes the public interest (which the SRA decides
unilaterally upon). Published decisions include: decisions to fine or
rebuke, decisions to prosecute at the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal
(SDT), decisions to control how a firm or an individual practices, decisions
to close a practice, and agreed outcomes with firms or individuals.
The SDT is constituted as a Statutory Tribunal under the UK
Solicitors Act 1974. Prosecution to the SDT is done by the SRA and is
necessary in severe cases such as striking a solicitor from the roll of
solicitors. The SDT also decides for reinstatements, i.e. restorations to the
roll of solicitors. It has 53 members, 34 of which are solicitors. These
solicitors should have no connection with the SRA. Publication of
outcomes comes late in the procedure. Decisions of the SRA to prosecute
will be published only when the SDT has certified that there is a case to
answer. Orders delivered by the SDT can be appealed before the High
Court. The SRA can also appeal against a decision by the SDT.
For instance, In the Matter of Pawan Vikram Sharma,148 at stake was
the misconduct of Mr. Sharma who, inter alia, forged signatures on five
occasions during a transaction and sent on his firm’s letterheaded paper to
facilitate a personal transaction. Despite admitting that the allegations were
Legal Profession in the United States and the Future of Global Law Practice, 19:2
PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (2009).
146. See Solicitors Regulation Authority, Research on alternative business structures
(ABSs) – Findings from surveys with ABSs and applicants that withdrew from the licensing
process, (May 2014).
147. The UK regulatory framework also includes a Legal Ombudsman and an Office of
Legal Complaints.
148. See Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, In the Matter of Pawan Vikram Sharma, No
10079-2008.
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true, Mr. Sharma denied that he had acted fraudulently or dishonestly. The
SDT initially found that, despite Mr. Sharma’s dishonesty, the fact that no
public harm occurred and Mr. Sharma was the beneficial owner of 100 percent
of the shares in the company on behalf of which he wrote on the firm’s
letterhead made this case exceptional. For these reasons, the SDT disciplined
Mr. Sharma with a three-year suspension from practice as a solicitor.
The SRA believed this sanction to be excessively lenient and therefore
appealed before the High Court arguing that the appropriate sanction in this
case would be disbarment.149 The High Court considered the Salsbury v.
Law Society150 test to find that it was not applicable in the end. Under the
circumstances of the case at issue, dishonesty from a solicitor could not be
permissible, as Mr. Sharma had repeatedly acted dishonestly and no
exceptional circumstances could justify such behaviour. Thus, the High
Court concluded that a striking-off order from the roll was appropriate.
The CJEU has also reviewed manifold decisions by professional
bodies to protect the fundamental freedoms in accordance with the treaties,
notably the freedom of establishment set out in Article 49 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the freedom to provide
services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU. Recognizing that the private bodies
can hamper market access and that the rules of free movement can have
horizontal effect, that is, they can be invoked against nongovernmental bodies
and individuals,151 the CJEU revolutionized the interpretation of the EU Treaties.
In Wilson, for instance, at issue was the Luxembourg Conseil d’Ordre
(Bar Council) refusal to register Mr. Wilson in the Bar Register, as the Bar
Council was unable to determine Mr. Wilson’s language knowledge. Mr.
Wilson decided not to appeal before the Bar’s Disciplinary and
Administrative Committee, but to the Administrative Court. The latter,
however, found that it had no jurisdiction. Subsequently, Mr. Wilson
appealed to the Higher Administrative Court, which decided to seek a
preliminary ruling by the CJEU. Mr. Wilson challenged the independence
of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar to substantiate his claim that the
disciplinary proceedings violated the Directive 98/5 requiring that refusals
of registration to the Bar be reviewed by a court of tribunal as defined by
EU law. The CJEU found that the condition of independence was not met.
According to the CJEU:152

149. Solicitors Regulation Authority v Parwan Vikram Sharma (2010) QBD (Admin).
150. EWCA Civ 1285, (2008) 1 WLR 1286 (2009).
151. See, for instance, Case 41/74, Van Duyn (1974) E.C.R. 1337, ¶4-8; and C-281/98,
Angonese (2000) E.C.R. I-4139.
152. C-506/04, Wilson (2006) E.C.R. I-8613, ¶53-55.
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The guarantees of independence and impartiality require
rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body
and the appointment, length of service and the grounds for
abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order
to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals
as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and
its neutrality with respect to the interests before it . . .
In this case, the composition of the Disciplinary and
Administrative Committee . . . is characterised by the
exclusive presence of lawyers of Luxembourg nationality. . .
As regards the Disciplinary and Administrative Appeals
Committee, the amendment made . . . confers overriding
influence on the assessors, who must be registered on the
same list and presented by the Bar Councils of each of the
Bar Associations referred to in the preceding paragraph of
this judgment, as compared with the professional magistrates.
. . .the Bar Council, whose members . . . are lawyers
registered in List I of the Bar Register, thus has its decisions
refusing registration of a European lawyer reviewed at first
instance by a body composed exclusively of lawyers
registered on the same list and on appeal by a body
composed for the most part of such lawyers.
In those circumstances, a European lawyer whose
registration on List IV of the Bar Register has been refused
by the Bar Council has legitimate grounds for concern that
either all or the majority, as the case may be, of the
members of those bodies have a common interest contrary
to his own, that is, to confirm a decision to remove from the
market a competitor who has obtained his professional
qualification in another Member State, and for suspecting
that the balance of interests concerned would be upset. . .
Thus, the Court was concerned about the impartiality of such private
enforcement bodies. Another element weighing against the Luxembourg Bar
was that subsequent judicial review by the domestic Supreme Court was limited
to issues of law according to the relevant legislation. However, in such cases,
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courts should have full jurisdiction to make an independent, de novo review.153
As private enforcement bodies de facto exercise judicial functions, the
CJEU has accepted early on that they can have recourse to the preliminary
reference mechanism in case of doubt as to the interpretation of EU law. In
Broekmeulen, the CJEU had to examine a refusal of the General
Practitioners Registration Committee, a body established by the Royal
Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine, to register as general
practitioner a doctor who obtained his diploma in Belgium.
In that case, interestingly, the Appeals Committee of the private body
sought a preliminary ruling by the CJEU. As a preliminary issue touching
upon the admissibility of the application, the CJEU had to decide whether
the Committee could come under the definition of a tribunal or court. The
CJEU acknowledged that, in the case at issue, the private body was fairly
powerful and access to ordinary courts was in fact nonexistent. The CJEU
held that the Appeals Committee must be regarded as a court or tribunal and
therefore have access to the preliminary ruling proceedings of the CJEU
relating to the interpretation of EU law. Two elements weighed heavily in the
minds of the judges: first, that this body operates with the consent and
cooperation of the public authorities; and second, that it delivers decisions
that are in fact recognized as final after an adversarial procedure.154

B. Engineering
Codes of ethics for the engineering profession in the US existed since
the beginning of the twentieth century and initially aimed to regulate the
professional ethos. Few years later, European engineering associations,
notably in Germany (e.g. DIN, VDI), have started becoming powerful and
produced legally binding rules for technological design. In the United States,
regulation and a fortiori enforcement against misconduct of engineers is rather
state-centered. This implies that mobility already at the federal level can be
challenging, notably as in some States generic licenses are issued, while in
others, licenses for specific disciplines of engineering (for instance, civil
engineering or mechanical engineering) are delivered. Exams are typically
organized by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and
Surveying (NCEES) to which each state’s engineering board is represented.
In some states, a board may be responsible for identifying misconduct
in engineering and related professions, such as architecture. Thus, in
Missouri, the Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, and

153. Cf. Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 2005, E.C, H.R., no. 49429/99, ¶98-104.
154. Case 246/80, Broekmeulen v Huisarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2311.
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Professional Land Surveyors and Landscape Architects are in charge of
ensuring the adherence to the relevant code of conduct. In a recent case,
the issue was whether a licensed professional engineer, Mr. Bird, should be
disciplined because he affixed his seal to building plans that were prepared
in large part by a licensed architect whose work was not done under the
engineer’s immediate personal supervision as the relevant Board
regulations required.155 Mr. Bird agreed to complete plans and drawings
for a commercial building project for Landmark Builders of Blue Springs
after the architect’s refusal to complete them. Landmark had previously
refused to pay an additional fee to the architect for the completion of the
drawings. The revision of the drawings was necessary because the
Planning Commission rejected them.
The Administrative Hearing
Committee (AHC), before which the Board filed a complaint, found that
Mr. Bird’s behaviour was faulty and subject to discipline because he did
not supervise the prior work of the architect. The Board subsequently
suspended Mr. Bird for three years to be followed by a year of probation.
Mr. Bird asked for a review before the Cole County Circuit Court which,
after finding serious errors in the AHC’ decision, remanded rehearing.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Bird’s appeal.
Ultimately, the matter was brought before the Missouri Supreme Court.156
The Court started by underscoring the breadth of its judicial review: “the
Court’s inquiry may extend to a determination of whether the action of the
agency is in violation of constitutional provisions, is in excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, is unsupported by competent
and substantial evidence upon the whole record, is, for any other reason,
unauthorized by law, is made upon unlawful procedure or without a fair trial, is
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or involves an abuse of discretion.”
The Court went on to hold that the purpose of professional regulation
is the protection of the public and not of the licensees. Therefore, any
financial losses or nullification of property interest of the architect are
irrelevant. Rather, the regulations at issue do nothing more than impose an
affirmative duty on licensees to ensure the quality of the work they
complete and to accept personal responsibility for documents they seal, a
duty that Mr. Bird actually fulfilled, just as he assumed full responsibility
for the entire project. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of the regulations was
to assign personal liability upon professionals in the case of defect. For
these reasons, the Court reversed the AHC decision and cleared Mr. Bird.
155. Regulations 4 CSR 30-3.030(7) and 4 CSR 30-13.010, which subject Mr. Bird to
discipline under section 327.441.2(6).
156. Bird v. Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land
Surveyors and Landscape Architects, 259 S.W. 3d 516 (2008).
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Thus, judicial review against decisions by professional disciplinary
bodies can be scrutinized thoroughly when the matter at issue pertains to
the legal interpretation of professional regulations. As the Missouri
Supreme Court put it in Bird: “Occupational licensing boards deserve
deference only in cases that require technical expertise in their respective
fields.” Under this spectrum, the role of judicial review shall be regarded
as a complementary one, providing guidance on legal questions, where the
professional bodies lack expertise.
Few years earlier, in Duncan v. Missouri Board for Architects,
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, at issue was a failure by a
certified engineer to review and check plans and drawings for which the
engineer was legally responsible. The Missouri Court of Appeals was
called upon to decide on a case whereby the license of a supervising
engineer was revoked because he affixed his seal to structural drawings that
were the basis for the fabricator’s shop drawings that provided for a defective
design.157 More specifically, because of the defective design, the second and
fourth floor walkways of Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City collapsed in
1981, leading to the death of 114 people and injuring at least another 186
people.158 In the aftermath of this tragedy, the Board sought to discipline the
professionals responsible for this project, including Mr. Duncan.
The AHC found several instances of gross negligence and held that
the licenses of the professionals accused had to be suspended or revoked.
The Board ultimately ordered the revocation of all licenses; this decision
was affirmed by the trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals. The
Court confirmed that the thrust of the regulations at issue was professional
accountability by a specific individual certified engineer to protect the
public. The rules relating to seal suggest that the responsibility imposed on
engineers for the entire project and all documents connected herewith is
full and non-delegable, unless a disclaimer is explicitly used. This is what
the engineer assumes responsibility for in exchange for the right to practice
the engineering profession.159 It bears mentioning that in this case none of
the engineers involved were convicted of criminal negligence.
The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) has also
adopted a code of ethics for engineers.160 The Board of Ethical Review is

157. Duncan v. Mo. Bd. For Architects, 744 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
158. See also Sarah Pfatteicher, “The Hyatt Horror”: Failure and responsibility in
American Engineering, 14:2 ASCE JOURNAL OF PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES
62 (2000).
159. See also Norbert Delatte, International Ethics and Failures. Case Studies, in
ENGINEERING ETHICS FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD 39 (Colleen Murphy et al., eds., 2015).
160. NAT’L SOC’Y OF PROF. ENGINEERS, Code of Ethics for Engineers, 2016, Publication # 1102.
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composed of seven licensed engineers. Its mission is, inter alia, to render
opinions as to the interpretation of the Code of Ethics. However, the Code
does not establish a disciplinary mechanism and thus the decisions have an
advisory nature.
In Ireland, the Institution of Engineers of Ireland (Engineers Ireland)
adopted a Code of Ethics that was last revised in 2009. An Ethics and
Disciplinary Board is the standing committee in charge of the enforcement
of the code. In substantiated cases, an Investigative and Disciplinary Panel
deals with a specific complaint. The Ethics Board is composed of sixteen
members where up to four persons are not members of the engineering
profession. Proceedings of the Board, Panel, Council and Appeal Board
are private. Reprimand, suspension, or exclusion from membership are the
most important sanctions that the Panel can impose. Any suspension or
erasure from Engineers Ireland is to be published in the Engineers Journal.
Appeals can be lodged with the three-member Appeal Board, where one
barrister of the Supreme Court also participates.
Self-regulation in engineering can vary depending on the jurisdiction.
In certain cases, a private regime exists in parallel with a public (not
necessarily competing) one, but members of the private regime are only
bound by the former. More interestingly, courts may be asked to establish
a hierarchy among potentially applicable and thus conflicting norms. In
Ontario, a question was raised as to the effects of the new Building Code
Act (BCA) on the otherwise qualified architects and engineers. In
Association of Professional Engineers (Ontario) v Ontario (Minister of
Municipal Affairs and Housing), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
(Divisional Court) found that professional architects and engineers were
not subject to the BCA and Building Code. Only through legislation could
one envisage parallel regulation of competence and professional integrity.
According to the Court, the BCA’s objective was not to advance public
safety, but rather to intrude on the exclusive mandate of the Association of
Professional Engineers (Ontario) and the Ontario Association of Architects
to qualify, govern, and discipline their members.
When it comes to the professions of architect and engineer, the CJEU
has notably been solicited in cases relating to the recognition of
professional qualifications (or, rather, the absence thereof). This has been
the case for various professions over the years, including lawyers. Thus,
settled case law suggests that domestic competent authorities are required
to take into account the knowledge, diplomas, certificates, qualifications
and experience already recognized or acquired in another EU MS, and give
adequate reasons in case of nonrecognition, as well as allow for access to
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an effective remedy.161 Of course, contrary to the profession of engineer,
architects in the European Union benefit from an automatic recognition
regime, along with a limited number of other professionals such as
midwives, doctors, or pharmacists.162
Thus, in professions where no automatic recognition can take place,
professionals that are negatively affected by the discretionary powers of the
relevant regulatory body in the host country have to be able to have access
to independent review of the decision of that body. Many times, only
public courts can ensure such review as a last resort.

C. Architecture
In the US, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) agreed on a
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct already at the beginning of the
20th century. It was most recently amended in 2012. The Code contains
rules of conduct that are mandatory, as well as canons (or ethical standards),
which are nonbinding rules. Failure to comply with the Code’s rules of
conduct constitutes grounds for disciplinary action by the National Ethics
Council (NEC).163 The NEC is composed of seven members appointed by the
AIA Board of Directors and can impose the following sanctions: (a)
admonition; (b) censure; (c) suspension of membership for a period of time;
and (d) termination of membership. In addition to decision, NEC also
delivers advisory opinions. Proceedings are confidential, as is the
discipline of admonition. All other sanctions are public. Decisions to
terminate membership in particular, are to be considered by the Executive
Committee, which, if approved, shall be reviewed by the Board, which is
the supreme body deciding about this sanction. Common ethics violations
include: attribution of credit (that is, stating or giving proper credit for
project involvement); accurate representation of qualifications; attainment
and provision of examples of work; and basic honesty.164
In its 90-12 decision of June 22, 1992, the NEC had to deal with a
claim against an architect who made false statements about the size and
composition of his firm and the experience and professional qualifications
of the employees of the firm, thereby violating certain rules of the AIA

161. See Joined Cases C-422/09; 425/09 and 426/09, Vandorou (2010) E.C.R. I-12411, ¶
65-71; C-345/08, Peśla (2009) E.C.R. I-11677.
162. Council Directive 2005/36/EC O.J. (L 255), at art. 21 (Professional Qualifications).
163. NAT’L ETHICS COUNCIL, Rules of Procedure, THE AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS 3.
(2016).
164. THE AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, The Architect’s Handbook of Professional Practice,
6 (2008).
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Code of Ethics. Architect A’s objective was to receive a rather specialized
commission by submitting information that would give him a comparative
advantage vis-à-vis other firms. Interestingly, architect A claimed that the
preparation of the firm brochure was the responsibility of the other
principal of the firm, who was not an AIA member, and thus was not bound
by the Code. The NEC was not convinced and instead submitted that
architect A should have been aware of the untruthfulness of the information
presented to the interview committee and underscored Members’ responsibility
for “what goes on in their firms.” Because misrepresentations were intentional
and due to the lack of professionalism from the side of architect A, the NEC
imposed the penalty of censure. The decision was appealed to the AIA
Executive Committee, which considered the sanction appropriate. In the
aftermath of the decision, architect A resigned his AIA membership.
More recently, in October 2009, the NEC had to deal with a complaint
brought against an architect who was accused of ignoring the effects that
her proposed design would have on adjoining property owned by the
complainants and of not disclosing information that would enable the
complainants to consent or to act to protect their interests. In addition, the
architect failed to notify the authorities of the unsafe and improper activity
of her clients. In its decision 2006-21,165 the NEC found that the architect
violated the rule prohibiting wanton disregard of the rights of others.
According to NEC case law, wanton disregard entails an action taken in
disregard of a “high degree of risk that the Complainant would be
adversely affected” and that risk “is apparent or would be apparent to a
reasonable person.” The NEC further found that, in effect, the architect
failed to resolve the matter or notify the competent authorities although she
was aware of unsafe and improper activity. Because of this and other
violations of the AIA Code, the NEC imposed the penalty of suspension of
AIA membership for three years.
In Australia, Members of the Royal Australian Institute of Architects
(RAIA) can be subject to the disciplinary mechanism of the association if
they fail to abide by the RAIA’s rules of conduct. The Memorandum of
Association of the RAIA provides that a Professional Conduct Tribunal
shall examine any complaint for misconduct against an Australian
architect. The Tribunal is comprised of fellows of the RAIA of at least 10
years standing, but it can also include a lawyer. The Tribunal can impose
the following sanctions: (private) reprimand, specific professional training
for a period determined by the RAIA Council, suspension of membership
165. Wanton Disregard of the Right of others; et. al Findings, 2006, Decision 21, National Ethics
Council of the American Institute of Architecture, available at: http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/
aia/documents/document/aiab082037.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
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not exceeding two years, and expulsion of membership. Arbitration is also
offered as a substitute to appeal mechanisms. Reinstatement is always
possible, but, in the case of expulsion, at least three years after the decision
by the RAIA Council.
In the United Kingdom, the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) is
the disciplinary tribunal that hears claims of inappropriate professional
conduct and incompetence against architects. The PCC is chaired by a
solicitor nominated by the Law Society; an architect and one lay member
will typically complete the three-member PCC whose hearings are public.
The PCC can issue reprimands, impose fines, suspend or expel an architect
of the Register. The Architects Act 1997 requires the publication of the
name and offense of those architects who have been found guilty.
In the Matter of Derrick Arthur Matthews, the PCC decided to erase
from its Register an architect who failed to properly manage his finances,
gave misleading information to be readmitted to the Register, and had
inadequate professional indemnity insurance coverage. Sanctions can also
be imposed when the complaint is not directly based on the architect’s
professional competence. For instance, In the Matter of Clive Wille, the
PCC decided that expulsion was the appropriate sanction for an architect
who had several personal problems (e.g., properly dealing with stress;
controlling violent tendencies) that affected his fitness to practice. The
PCC left the possibility for reinstatement open after two years.166
According to the relevant rules of procedure,167 individuals negatively
affected by a decision of the Investigations Panel not willing to refer a
matter to the PCC can request a third-party independent review.
Alternatively, recourse to ordinary judicial proceedings is possible.
Judicial review of decisions of private enforcement mechanisms by
the ordinary courts appears to be fairly deferential and marginal, thereby
accepting at least implicitly the expertise of the disciplinary mechanisms of
the professional associations, but also the importance of legal certainty
when egregious errors are absent. For instance, in Nye v. Ohio Board Of
Examiners of Architects, the Court of Appeals of the Ohio Tenth Appellate
District had to examine an appeal against a judgment by the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas to affirm an order by the Ohio Board of
Examiners of Architects to revoke the certificate of qualification of an

166. Professionall
Conduct
Community,
ARCHITECTS
REGISTRATION
BD.,
http://www.arb.org.uk/professional_standards/regulating_architects/pcc_decisions/wille.php (last
visited May 2, 2016).
167. See Investigation Rules and Professional Conduct Committee Rules, ARCHITECTS
REGISTRATION BD., http://www.arb.org.uk/files/files/PCC%20rules%202015%20with%20Form
%20A.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
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architect to practice architecture.168 In proceedings unrelated to this case,
the architect had admitted to fraud, fraudulent transfers and conduct
preventing the discharge of debt under the bankruptcy code through a
settlement agreement that he concluded with the complainant, the Redeemer
Lutheran Church (RLC). Based on these circumstances, the Board considered
erasure from the Register to be an adequate sanction. In doing so, the Board
found that the sanction of suspension for at least one year that the Hearing
Officer previously recommended was too lenient. The Court of Appeals
used the res judicata doctrine and the terms of the settlement agreement to
ultimately affirm the decision of the County Court.
Nevertheless, ordinary courts will still apply basic principles of law,
especially in cases of manifest legal errors such as ultra vires claims. In
Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects,169 the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, which in turn had
agreed with the findings of the Court of Queen’s Bench. The latter had
quashed the disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Practice Review Board
of the Alberta Association of Architects against a firm of architects. In that
case, according to the Architects Act, the Board was only allowed to report
to the Council of the Alberta Association of Architects and make
appropriate recommendations and not assume functions that are entrusted
to the Complaint Review Committee of the Association.

VI. Private Enforcement and Constitutional Matters
When examining the constitutional dimension of private enforcement,
one important area that is worth examining is the interaction between
certain restrictions enclosed in professional codes of ethics, such as
restrictions relating to communications and advertising on one side, and the
protection of human rights on the other.
In particular, professional advertising is considered an essential
component of the freedom of commercial speech. In Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,170 the United States Supreme Court allowed attorney advertising
for the first time by relying on the First Amendment. More specifically, it
condemned blanket bans on price advertising and fees charged by attorneys
and rules preventing attorneys from using nondeceptive terminology to
describe their fields of practice. According to the Court, “such speech
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable

168. Nye v. Ohio Bd. Of Examiners of Architects, 165 Ohio App.3d 502 (2006).
169. Chandler v. Alta. Ass’n of Architects, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848 (Can.).
170. Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 US 350 (1977).
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decisionmaking” from consumers.171 In that case, the Supreme Court found
that the postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true
professionalism to be severely strained.172 It went on to hold that “since the
belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism, the
historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled.”173
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,174 the US Supreme Court
clarified that,
Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and
does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted
only in the service of a substantial governmental
interest, and only through means that directly advance
that interest.175 Since state regulation of commercial
speech may extend only as far as the interest it serves,
state rules that are designed to prevent the potential for
deception and confusion may be no broader than
reasonably necessary to prevent perceived evil.
Therefore, restrictions relating to commercial speech that is not itself
deceptive is to be narrowly crafted. Having said this, the Supreme Court
confirmed that states have a substantial margin for manoeuvre, as they have
a substantial interest to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech
that is false, deceptive, misleading, or which proposes an illegal
transaction.176 Hence, state rules prohibiting in-person solicitation of clients
by lawyers can be permissible under certain circumstances, as the states
bear “a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of
the licensed professions and notably lawyers who are essential to the
171. Id. at 365. See also Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
172. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
173. Id. at 372.
174. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n., 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
175. This is the so-called Central Hudson test which includes four prongs: (a) is the regulated
speech misleading or involves unlawful activity; (b) the state’s interest in limiting speech is
substantial; (c) the regulation advances this interest in a direct and material way; and (d) the
extent of the restriction on protected speech is narrowly crafted toward the interest served. The
burden of proof lies with the state authorities. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). For the demanding burden of proof
under this test, see the (concurring in part) opinion of Justice Brennan and Marshall in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 659.
176. Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 US 748, at
771-2 (1976); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Pittsburgh Press Co v. Human Relations
Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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primary governmental function of administrating justice and have
historically been ‘officers of the Courts.’”177 Even if lawyers are selfemployed businessmen who are interested in pursuing their self-interest,
they are also expected to act as trusted agents of their clients and as
assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes.178
Thus, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,179 the Supreme Court found
that face-to-face solicitation by a lawyer for profit is a practice rife with
possibilities of overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue
influence and outright fraud. Whenever state rules and ethical standards of
lawyers are linked to the service and protection of clients notably by
protecting their privacy, they further the goals of true professionalism and
thus are admissible.180 Such measures, including outright bans of in-person
solicitation can be prophylactic ones, aiming to prevent harm before it
occurs, and therefore, proof of actual harm is not required. Such measures
are necessary, because in-person solicitation is not visible or otherwise
subject to effective oversight either by the state or the legal profession.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,181 the Supreme Court
dealt with three more precise questions: prohibitions on soliciting legal
business through advertisements containing advice and information
regarding specific legal problems; restrictions on the use of illustrations in
advertising by lawyers; and disclosure requirements relating to the terms of
contingent fees. Examining the three issues in turn, the Supreme Court
found that lawyers’ newspaper advertisements containing truthful and nondeceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential
clients as well as accurate and nondeceptive illustrations are permissible.
Thus, attorneys are allowed to go beyond passive advertising and use a
more aggressive, but still truthful printed solicitation to attract clients.
However, it found that, even if freedom of commercial speech invalidates
any compulsion to speak, a State should be allowed to seek the maximum
information to prevent deception of consumers. Advertisers’ rights are
protected as long as the disclosure requirements regarding the client’s
liability for costs are reasonably related to the state objective.
Later on, the Supreme Court relaxed its Ohralik jurisprudence.
Thus, it ruled in Shapero that, contrary to in-person solicitation,
targeted, direct-mail solicitation is protected by the First Amendment.
Although the Court accepted that personalized targeted mailing poses
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961).
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Id. at 458-9, 462.
Sauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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several risks, it found that a written solicitation is different from inperson solicitation, and therefore a total ban against the former would
be unnecessary, as a less restrictive alternative would be to simply
require that the lawyers file any solicitation letter with a state agency,
“giving the State ample opportunity to supervise mailings and penalize
actual abuses.”182 In more recent cases, the Supreme Court accepted that:
-

specializations of lawyers can under certain circumstances
be advertised;183
a 30-day ban on direct mail solicitation in accident or
disaster cases to protect the privacy of potential recipients
is permissible.184

It remains open whether and how to regulate unverifiable claims made
by lawyers in advertisements seeking to convey the quality of their legal
services. For instance, the New York Code of Professional Responsibility
adopted in 2006 included rules prohibiting the use of nicknames, trade
names, and marketing slogans that may imply an unproved ability to win
cases. In addition, the use of marketing gimmicks and other attentiongetting techniques not containing objective information about legal services
was equally prohibited. In Alexander v. Cahill, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found in 2010 that such regulations do not
materially advance the state’s interest in prohibiting the dissemination of
misleading information.185 The United States Supreme Court denied hearing
the case. Few years earlier, nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court upheld
restrictions prohibiting a law firm from using an image of a pit bull in its
advertisements.186
In In re R.M.J., the US Supreme Court condemned absolute prohibitions
on certain types of potentially misleading advertisements:187

182. Shapero, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988). Previously, in Primus, the United States Supreme
Court had found that communications that can be regarded as a mode of political speech would
be protected more generously than the other cases relating to commercial speech and therefore
state regulation would be scrutinized more broadly. Obviously the absence of pecuniary gain
plays a decisive role here: Ohralik, 436 U.S. 412.
183. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Ibanez
v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
184. The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
185. Alexander v Cahill, 589 F.3d, 79 (2d Cir. 2010).
186. Floriba Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2005).
187. Inre RM.J. 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But
when the particular content or method of the advertising
suggests that it is inherently misleading or when
experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject
to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the
States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types
of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas
of practice, if the information also may be presented in a
way that is not deceptive.
The Court also reaffirmed the notion that a state might require a
warning or disclaimer to minimize the likelihood of consumer confusion or
deception.188 However, disclaimers should not be unduly burdensome and
thus rule out the ability of lawyers to employ short advertisements. The US
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit argued as much in Public Citizen Inc.
v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board.189 In that case, the Fifth Circuit
also outlawed rules prohibiting lawyers from advertising previous litigation
successes and testimonials and banning advertising that depicts a jury or a
judge. Thus, regulation of attorney advertising will continue to be a topical
matter, as states attempt to cope with the emergence of new media and the
limits of content that can be advertised by lawyers.
In De Moor v. Belgium,190 the European Court of Human Rights
(ECTHR) had to examine a complaint by a retired army officer whose
application to be entered in the list of trainee advocates of the Hasselt was
rejected by the Bar Council Mr. De Moor challenged the decision before
the Conseil d’Etat Almost eight years later, the Conseil d’Etat decided
to dismiss the appeal, considering that it lacked jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Bar Council The Court underscored that once Mr. De
Moor fulfilled the conditions for admission, his right of access to the Bar
could not be hampered On the contrary, the disputed decision gave no
reasons as to the objective conditions that the candidate failed to fulfill
The Court found that no public hearing was held to scrutinize the
application and the decision was not delivered in public, thereby violating
Mr. Moor’s right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of
ECTHR.

188. Id. at 201.
189. Public Citizen Inc v. Couisimm Attorney Disciplinary Board, 632 F3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).
190. De Moor v. Belgium, 1994 E.C.H.R No. 09-30925.
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VII. Private Enforcement and Competition Law
Enforcing antitrust rules in professional services to harness abuse of
monopoly power and cartel-like behavior by self-regulating professional
bodies has been an important task of the judicial branch. Close surveillance
and control of the activities of largely self-regulating professional bodies is
necessary, as the number of labor forces dependent on licensing procedures
giving access to a given occupation grows.191 A peculiarity of law-related
competition analysis regarding self-regulating bodies endowed with
regulatory power by the state is that no per se (or as such) abuse is created by
the mere fact of assigning exclusive rights or a dominant position in a given
market.192 Indeed, as the US Supreme Court noted in Goldfarb, the public
service aspect of certain professional services and other features of the
professions at stake may call for a more nuanced approach.193 What is
rather key in such an inquiry is whether an abuse of such rights took place
that led to an unreasonable market distortion that cannot be outweighed by
any procompetitive justification.194 For instance, the US Supreme Court
found a prohibition to engage in fraudulent practices or untruthful and
deceptive advertising reasonable.195
Professional rules of private bodies that may have anti-competitive
effects include rules relating to price fixing; recommended prices and
minimum fees; restrictions relating to commercial communications and
advertising; quantitative restrictions to the number of licenses emitted;196
entry requirements and reserved rights; and regulations relating to legal
form, ownership and multidisciplinary practices.197 In several instances,
professional bodies worldwide have included these types of restrictions in
191. See Morris Kleiner & Alan Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational
Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S198 (2013).
192. Cf. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-104 (1984); Case C-351/12, OSA, 2014,
C.J.E.U., 110, ¶83-84.
193. See, Lewis Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-789 (1975); “may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.”
194. The corresponding four-prong test that the CJEU applies is set out in TFEU art. 101:3.
See Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax and Administración del Estado, (2006) E.C.R. I-11125, ¶65.
In that case, the CJEU clarified that in assessing the application of Article 101 of the TFEU,
account must be had on the actual context in which a given decision by the professional body is
situated, notably the economic and legal context; the nature of the goods or services affected, and
the real conditions of the functioning and the structure of the market at stake. Id. ¶49.
195. California Dental Association v FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
196. For instance, a decision of the regulating private body to issue only a small number of new
licenses to practice each year. See Hoover v Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
197. Cf. Communication from the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional
Services, COM (2004) 83 final, at 3 (2004).
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their codes of ethics and linked them to the proper conduct of the
profession or even consumer protection.198
In Goldfarb,199 the United States Supreme Court was called upon to
examine the consistency of a minimum-fee schedule and its enforcement
mechanism with the Sherman Act, as applied to fees for legal services
performed by attorneys in examining titles in connection with financing the
purchase of real estate. Previously, the Court of Appeals expressed the
traditional view at the time that occupational regulation increases quality
and reduces information asymmetries without any negative spillovers.
Thus, it found that the State Bar’s action was immune from liability as state
action. The practice of law does not constitute trade or commerce within
the meaning of the Sherman Act, according to the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court, however, found that the Virginia State Bar
practice constituted price-fixing and thus violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The schedule was a rigid price floor enforced through the threat of
professional discipline by the State Bar, and by tacitly ensuring that other
lawyers would not compete by underbidding. It created a price system
that consumers were bound to use, as title examination is a necessary step
in financing a real estate purchase. The Supreme Court went on to
examine the alleged immunity of the ‘learned professions’ under the
Sherman Act. The Court took issue with the Court of Appeals and
reminded that the nature of an occupation, standing alone, cannot exclude
the application of the Sherman Act, especially when one considers its
comprehensive language, whereas the public-service aspect of
professional practice is not controlling in determining whether § 1 of the
Sherman Act includes professions.200 The Court observed:201
the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange
of such a service for money is “commerce” in the most
common usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the
practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has
this business aspect. . . (Footnote omitted).

198. Commission Decision of 24 June 2004 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of
the EC Treaty concerning case COMP/A.38549 – Belgian Architects’ Association (June 24, 2004).
199. Lewis Goldfarb , 421 U.S. 773, 773.
200. Id. Here, the Court referred to a previous case, United States v. Nat’l Assoc. of Real
Estate Boards, 339 US at 485, 489 (1950).
201. Lewis Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 787. However, the Supreme Court clarified that, in
certain circumstances, in view of the public interest aspect and the features of certain professions,
it may be possible that certain restraints, which would otherwise be considered as violating the
Sherman Act, would be treated differenty. Id. at 789.
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The Supreme Court went on to add:202
In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activities
of lawyers play an important part in commercial
intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers
may exert a restraint on commerce.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that professional
licensing activities affect interstate commerce and cannot escape the
application of antitrust rules under the Sherman Act. A few years later, the
United States Supreme Court had to decide on the compatibility of the
Sherman Act with a rule of ethics adopted by the NSPE prohibiting its
members from submitting competitive bids for engineering services.203
Thus, engineers were guided to refuse to negotiate or even discuss the
question of fees until the client has selected the engineer for a particular
project. The Supreme Court held that the rule at stake amounted to collusion
among competitors who refused to discuss prices with potential clients until
negotiations result in the initial selection of an engineer. This practice operates
as an absolute ban on competitive bidding.
The Court ruled that unfettered competition was essential to the health
of a free market economy and the only lawful way competition could be
restrained was through state or federal legislation. Having said this, ethical
norms in professional services may serve to regulate and promote competition
in such services. In its judgment, the Court dismissed arguments stressing the
possible negative effects of fee competition on the health, safety, and welfare
of the public. The Court also emphasized that enforcement of antitrust rules
does not impinge on the First Amendment.204
Similarly, the United States Justice Department in the same period of
time determined that the Sherman Act of 1890 demanded that architects be
allowed to compete on the basis of fees and that not doing so constituted an
unreasonable trade restriction.
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the
United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a decision
by the professional selfregulating body to exclude nondentists from the
market for teeth whitening services in North Carolina can be subject to the
Sherman Act. The Court first recalled that certain activities of states in
202. Id. at 788.
203. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978).
204. Id. at 697, citing to Giboney v Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 US 490, 502 (1949).
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their sovereign capacity which are anticompetitive can escape the purview
of the Sherman Act. For this, the challenged anticompetitive restraint must
be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and such
policy must be actively supervised by the state.205 According to the Court,
active supervision means that the state has review mechanisms in place that
offer a realistic assurance that the private regulator promotes state policy
when acting in a noncompetitive manner. This would mean that the state
should be able to review the substance of the anticompetitive decision and
if needed, veto or modify that decision to ensure its alignment with state
policy. In addition, to ensure impartiality and objectivity, the State cannot
itself be an active market participant in that same market.
In the case at hand, the Supreme Court found that, absent any active
supervision by the state (which in most professional associations is
missing), the Board cannot invoke state-action antitrust immunity as
established in Parker v. Brown206 if a controlling number of the Board’s
decision-makers are in fact active market participants in the same
profession that the Board regulates.207 Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted
narrowly the concept of the “exercise of the State’s sovereign power” and
confirmed that private regulators lack immunity for anticompetitive
behaviour unless the State accepts political accountability for such behavior
that permits and controls.208 This is so even if such bodies exercise public
functions.209 Implicitly, the Supreme Court also re-opened the discussion
regarding job allocation in the case of overlapping scope of practice for

205. This two-tier test was first established by the Supreme Court in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Assn. v Medcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105. For a discussion, see EDLIN AND
HAW, supra note 37.
206. The state-action exemption was recognized by the US Supreme Court in Parker v
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
207. North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct.1101, 1112 (2015).
208. In the aftermath of this decision, the FTC produced a document offering nonbinding
clarifications as to the concept of active supervision. See FTC Staff Guidance on Active
Supervision of State Regulatory Boards Controlled by Market Participants (October 2015). A
similarly narrow hermeneutic approach was adopted by the CJEU in Wouters where the Court
found that competition rules cannot apply to an activity which, by its nature, its aim and the rules
to which it is subject, does not belong to the sphere of economic activity, or which is connected
with the exercise of the powers of a public authority: Case C-309/99, Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh
and Price Waterhouse Belastingadiviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten, (2002) E.C.R. I-1577, ¶57 [hereinafter Wouters]. For an application of this test in the
profession of chartered accountants, see Case C-1/12, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas,
2013, E.C.R (EU).
209. Cf. R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex parte Datafin Pic, (1987) Q.B. 815 (U.K.)
(finding that the City’s self-regulating mechanism for mergers and acquisitions is amenable to
judicial review).
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possibly competing professions.210
As noted earlier, anticompetitive behavior may be part and parcel of a
professional code of ethics. Just like the US Supreme Court’s, settled
CJEU case law suggest that rules of professional ethics come within the
scope of EU competition law, as they organize and influence the exercise
of a given profession.211 The compatibility of rules contained in CoC with
EU law may be contentious when examined through the lens of
competition law. Such an examination is, however, necessary to ensure
that equally competitive conditions are offered to the economic operators
active in the EU market, and that rules enshrined in codes of professional
conduct do not impose anti-competitive behaviour.212
On the other side of the Atlantic, the CJEU adopted a sweeping view as to
the applicability of competition rules to professional services. In Wouters, the
CJEU held that lawyers are undertakings within the meaning of Article 101
TFEU.213 The Court justified this finding by noting that they offer services
against remuneration and bear the financial risks that failures may entail.214 By
the same token, the Bar should be regarded as an association of undertakings that
adopts a collusive behaviour in contravention of Article 101 in that it influences
the conduct of its members on the market in the relevant services sector and
directs them to act in a particular manner when they carry their economic
activity.215 These findings apply to every professional association and its
members, as long as they have some regulatory powers.216 Thus, rules created in
the exercise of a professional body’s regulatory autonomy and discretion, such as
the adoption of codes of professional conduct (or of certain rules therein, such as
those relating to advertising or minimum/maximum fees), are decisions adopted
by an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101:1 TFEU.217
The CJEU also ruled that a violation of Articles 10 and 81 EC (now 4:3 on

210. Morris Kleiner, Battling over Jobs: Occupational Licensing in Health Care, 106(5) AM.
ECON. R: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 165 (2016).
211. Case T-144/99, Institut des mandataires agréés (2001) E.C.R. II-1087, ¶64.
212. Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniko
Dimosio (2008) E.C.R. I-4863, ¶51.
213. Art. 101 TFEU prohibits as incompatible with the internal market all decisions by
associations of undertakings which may affect trade between MS and which have as their object
of effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the EU internal market.
214. Wouters, supra note 208 at ¶49.
215. Id. ¶ 63-4.
216. For the importance of this trait, see the Judgment of the General Court in Case T-90/11,
Ordre national des pharmaciens (ONP), 2014, E.C.R, 1049, ¶347.
217. Wouters, supra note 206, ¶71. See also T-144/99, Institut des mandataires agréés, ¶62.
Interestingly, in this ruling, the General Court found that an outright prohibition of
comparative advertising incorporated in a CoC can violate Article 101 TFEU. Id. at ¶79.
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the Treaty on European Union-TEU218 and 101 TFEU, respectively) occurs
when (a) a MS divests its rules of legislative character through delegation to
private economic actors of the responsibility to take decisions affecting the
economic sphere, or (b) a MS requires or even encourages collusive behaviour
contrary to Article 101 or reinforces its effects.219 Under this latter option, the
behaviour of all self-regulatory bodies can be examined against the EU
competition rules. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the activity of
professional associations can also constitute an abuse of dominant position.220
In Mauri,221 the issue was whether a violation of EU competition rules
occurs in case when access to the legal profession is determined by a state
examination committee, which consists of five members and two of them – or
potentially three – are already members of the Bar. The CJEU found that this is
outweighed by the presence of two judges who must be regarded as an
emanation of that state. Other outweighing factors also are that the Ministry of
Justice can potentially intervene at every state of the process, whereas negative
decisions can be appealed before the administrative court, which will conduct a
de novo review. Thus, sufficient state involvement coalesced to the
inapplicability of competition rules.
The result in Mauri was in line with the CJEU’s finding in Wouters that
rules adopted by a professional association are, for all practical purposes, state
measures. Therefore, they fall outside the scope of the EU competition rules
when an EU MS grants regulatory powers to that professional association. This
is so even if the state defines the public interest criteria and the essential
principles with which the rules of the professional associaton must comply and
retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort.222 In addition, the Court
clarified that the fact that a given activity by the professional body does not aim
to make a profit cannot alone prevent the application of Article 101 TFEU where
the offer of services by this body coexists in competition with that of other, forprofit operators.223
In Wouters, the CJEU also found that outright prohibitions of
multidisciplinary practices in the legal profession enclosed in legislative acts or
218. Art. 4.3 TEU incorporates the so-called duty of loyalty for EU MS vis-a-vis the EU and
other EU MS. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007 [2009, later known as Treaty of the European Union,
consolutated in 2016 C-2-2/16, O.J Thereafter TEUJ.
219. Case C-35/99, Arduino, (2002) E.C.R. I-1529, ¶35; Case 267/86, Van Eycke v. ASPA NV,
(1988) E.C.R. 4769, ¶16.
220. See Panagiotis Delimatsis, “Thou Shall Not… (Dis)Trust”: Codes of Conduct and
Harmonization of Professional Standards in the EU, 47 COMMON MKT L. REV. 1049, 1084 (2010).
221. Case C-250/03, Mauri (2005) E.C.R. I-1267, ¶29-37.
222. Wouters, supra note 208 at ¶54.
223. See Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorrencia, supra Note
208, at ¶57.
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codes of conduct violate Article 101:1(b). This is because they are liable to limit
production and technical development,224 as they do not allow the exploitation of
the one-stop-shop advantage, the supply of ‘full service’ and the possible
diminution of costs. However, the CJEU submitted that the rules at issue were
designed to ensure the proper conduct of the profession and the sound
administration of justice. Therefore, they were justified and proportionate,
thereby striking a balance between the anti-competitive behaviour and the
pursuit of non-economic legitimate objectives, which may, however, have procompetitive effects.225
Enforcement of competition rules is achieved through the judicial route but
also through the DG Competition of the European Commission. For instance, in
2004, the Commission struck down the recommended fee scale operated by the
Belgian Architects’ Association.226 Although the scale was described as a
guideline with which not all architects had complied, the Commission found that
the fee scale was an independent act of prescriptive character for which the
Association, acting as an association of undertakings according to Article 101
TFEU, was wholly responsible.
Regional competition authorities also attempt to strike down anticompetitive practices of professionals.
For instance, the Finnish
Competition Authority challenged the practice of the Association of
Finnish Architects (SAFA) that prevented its members from entering
architectural competitions only after consulting with or receiving
approval by SAFA. According to the Finnish Competition Authority, this
behaviour constitutes an impermissible output limitation. 227

224. Wouters, supra note 208, at ¶90.
225. See Pietro Manzini, The European Rule of Reason: Crossing the Sea of Doubt, 23 ECL
REV. 392 (2002). Such an interpretation also exemplifies a tendency to apply Art. 101 based on
the methodology of jurisprudence relating to free movement. See R. O’Loughlin, EC
Competition Rules and Free Movement Rules: An Examination of the Parallels and their
Furtherance by the ECJ Wouters Decision, 24 ECL REV. 62 (2003). In Métropole, the General
Court contended that a balancing of anti- and pro-competitive effects can only be accepted under
the narrow confines of Art. 101:3 TFEU. Case T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6), (2001)
E.C.R. II-2459, ¶74. Arguably, the CJEU was convinced that the rules at issue in Wouters were
welfare-enhancing and thus pro-competitive. See also Communication from the Commission:
Notice of Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, 2004 OJ C 101/98, ¶11,
85, 91-93. It is worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court found that ethical rules can promote
competition and thus fall within the rule of reason: See National Society of Professional
Engineers v. US, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). See also the Opinion of the AG Léger in Wouters,
supra note 208++ at ¶112.
226. Decision of 26.06.2004, COMP/38.549 - PO / L'Ordre des Architectes belges, available at :
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38549/38549_72_1.pdf(last
accessed
September 15, 2016).
227. FINNISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, Output limitation in application of architectural
competition conditions. Dnro 669/61/02, (October 11, 2004).
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Pro-competition provisions that lead to better access to professions in
certain markets can also be part of legislative instruments aiming at the
liberalization of the service sector in general. For instance, in the EU, a
long-lasting discussion as to the anti-competitive effects of total bans on
advertising culminated to the adoption of a provision in the EU Services
Directive outlawing total bans on commercial communications. This per se
prohibition has been applied strictly by the CJEU in a recent case regarding
a total prohibition of canvassing in the profession of qualified accountant in
France.228 After defining ‘canvassing’ as an unsolicited personal offer of
goods or services to a certain natural or legal person, the Court found that
the concept of commercial communication set out in Article 24:1 of the
Services Directive is sufficiently broad to cover canvassing that is yet
another form of direct marketing. Therefore, a total prohibition of this
form of commercial communication is inconsistent with the EU Services
Directive and cannot be justified based on a legitimate public interest nor is
it proportionate to the objective it wants to achieve. Crucially, the CJEU
took a pro-liberalization/pro-competition stance adhering to the view that
such prohibitions of advertising deprive EU service suppliers of an effective
means of penetrating a given EU market.229 Arguably, the most interesting
element of this judgment by the CJEU is the fact that the Court dismissed in
two sentences the possibility for justifying such a restriction, alluding to the
narrow test that it is willing to apply in similar cases in the future.

VIII. Conclusion
The objective of this article has been to map rules, instances, and
institutions of enforcement in transnational private regulation regimes.
Such regimes shape the new landscape for global practice of various
professions; they keep the tradition of domestic self-regulation in the
shadow of the law and the State but dramatically expand its territorial
scope through the globalization of guidelines, recommendations and codes
of conduct and ethics. At the same time, self-contained disciplinary
regimes for global professionals are virtually non-existent. Rather, the
creation of disciplinary rules in international professional associations is
left for the future. Nevertheless, the future will soon become the present,
as over half of global exports in services are in the business services sector.
To date, there are noteworthy variations in private, non-judicial
disciplinary proceedings, which are fairly interesting when ordinary

228. See Case C-119/09, Société fiduciaire nationale d’expertise comptable, 2011, E.C.R, 208
229. See, by analogy, Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, 1995 E.C.R. I-1141, ¶28, 38.
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judicial proceedings are also involved, typically at the appeal stage. In the
latter case, fair trial considerations and clemency when judged by a
professional body are more often than not reasons for striking down or
amending rulings made by the disciplinary bodies of professional
associations. Participation of state representatives and/or non-professionals
can under certain circumstances, ensure independence and impartiality, as
well as satisfy due process.
Having said this, the turn to informality230 at the global level seems to
be irreversible and permeates virtually all types of economic activity. Our
analysis, while explorative, demonstrates that the State (in its various
forms) endows professional associations with self-regulatory authority, but is
still omnipresent in the regulation of professional services.231 In addition,
professional associations may be regarded as decentralized state agencies, as
American courts found for the State Bars. However, principal-agent issues
will most likely arise, as amply demonstrated by the case law discussed above.
Private enforcement is essential when technical expertise is needed to
adequately decide on a complaint against a given professional. On the
other hand, private disciplinary bodies (other than in the legal profession)
may lack legal expertise. In that case, it is quintessential to have envisaged
a disciplinary system that is open to an appeal in ordinary courts or else
ensure that essential due process rights and the rule of law find expression
in the statutes, rules, and by-laws of the professional association at stake.
Self-regulation has been regarded as an excellent way for the State to
remedy information asymmetries and diminish monitoring and enforcement
costs. Enforcement before private bodies that are composed in accordance
with the statutes of a professional association or its code of professional
conduct can indeed be more expedient and somehow alleviate the workload
of courts. In this sense, private non-judicial enforcement and public
judicial mechanisms are functionally mutually reinforcing.232 However,
allegations against the impartiality, objectivity and proper constitution of
their disciplinary mechanisms undermine any sincere efforts by

230. Cf. Joost Pauwelyn et al., When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and
Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733 (2014) (discussing the
increased cooperation and cross-border agreements made outside traditional legal
institutions, such as the UN and WTO).
231. Cf. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition
Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, at 281282 (2005) (arguing that commitment by States still matters even when private bodies in
fact finalize and operate a transnational agreement).
232. See also FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, Enforcing transnational private regulation: models and
patterns, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION – ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A
GLOBAL WORLD 75, 81 (Fabrizio Cafaggi, ed., 2012).
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professional bodies to take full advantage of the opportunities that selfregulation provides. Governmental authorities and public courts may be
called upon to scrutinize complaints about anticompetitive practices,
market foreclosure, excessive prices, and monopolies, and to balance
between incommensurables. However, the more powerful transnational
private regimes as meta-regulators become, the more official judicial
mechanisms will see the need for more transnational cooperation and
perhaps collective review of claims.233
Transnational professional associations have to intensify their work on
levelling the playing field with regard to canons of ethics for a given
profession. This includes, inter alia, increasing the level of transparency
internally. Possibilities for drawing inspiration from the legal and judicial
systems around the world abound. As mobility of professionals increases
in a globalized business environment, demands for more streamlined rules
will be emerging more often, leading to more concerted efforts for mutual
recognition or equivalence.
In addition, new technologies should be expected to further transform
the way professional expertise is sought, found, supplied and diffused.234
Technological advances will render necessary a reconceptualization of all
issues relating to professions, from the initiation of mandates to the
conundrum of efficient remedies. This will lead to disruptive innovations that
will transform extant market structures in all backbone professions, including
the three analyzed in this article.235 To avoid the danger of becoming
irrelevant soon, professional associations should intensify their work at the
national and transnational level to factor in these important developments and
use them to positively modernize the supply of professional services.
Researchers will have to critically review such transformations at regular
intervals with a view to ensuring that economic opportunities are distributed
evenly and in a pro-competitive manner. At the more abstract level, future
research will need to more closely assess the extent transnationalism affects the
future and fate of self-regulation in professional services.

233. See also, EYAL BENVENISTI AND GEORGE DOWNS, National courts and transnational
private regulation, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION – ENSURING COMPLIANCE
IN A GLOBAL WORLD 131, 140 (Fabrizio Cafaggi, ed., 2012).
234. See also, RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE
PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2015).
235. See also Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the US Legal
Services Market, 9 NYU J. OF L. & BUS. 1 (2012).

